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I.

INTRODUCTION

Libertarian and some conservative writers have pined for return to a
“classical” understanding of U.S. constitutions, particularly the Federal
Constitution.1 “Classical” does not necessarily mean “originalist” or strictly

*
Professor of Law and History, University of Iowa. Thanks to Steven J. Burton, Thomas
P. Gallanis, Todd Pettys, and Jason Rantanen for commenting on a draft.
1. E.g., DAVID N. MAYER, LIBERTY OF CONTRACT: REDISCOVERING A LOST CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHT (2011); THOMAS R. POPE, SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE: TOO
MUCH LIBERTY AND TOO MUCH AUTHORITY (2013); TIMOTHY SANDEFUR, THE CONSCIENCE OF THE
CONSTITUTION: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND THE RIGHT TO LIBERTY (2014); Steven
G. Calabresi, On Liberty, Equality, and the Constitution: A Review of Richard A. Epstein’s The Classical
Liberal Constitution, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 839 (2014); Steven Menashi & Douglas H. Ginsburg,
Rational Basis with Economic Bite, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1055 (2014); Ilya Somin, Libertarianism
and Originalism in The Classical Liberal Constitution, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1045 (2014); Richard
E. Wagner, Richard Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution: A Public Choice Refraction, 8 N.Y.U.
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textualist. Some classical views, such as the attempt to revitalize Lochner-style
economic due process,2 find little support in the isolated text of the Federal
Constitution or any of the contemporary state constitutions. Rather,
constitutional meaning is thought to lie in a background link between
constitution formation and classical statecraft. While the text is important,
classical liberalism becomes the essential framework through which the
Constitution is interpreted.3 That might make sense if classical liberalism were
the framework within which the Constitution was written, but it was not.
The classical Constitution is sometimes said to rest on a constructed
social contract to which everyone in some initial position agreed. As is true of
any contract, it would make every participant a winner.4 The participants have
“rights of liberty and property antecedent to the state,” but choose to give up
as little of these as needed to empower government.5 Because insisting on
either unanimous consent or individual voter participation on every issue is
impractical and unwise, republican representative government comes into
existence. But then it is essential that this government act consistently with
the social contract and not be captured by special interests. This classical
theory applies to both “macro” concerns, such as state policy toward economic
development or welfare, and also to “micro” concerns, including liberty of
private contract, strong rights in both conventional and intellectual property,
and the right to engage in business with no more than the essential minimum
of State oversight. Finally, it tends toward libertarianism on questions of
noneconomic individual rights, as long as their exercise does not harm others
excessively.6
The foundational sources claimed for the classical Constitution include:
Locke’s writings on government; the political thought of Hobbes, Hume, and
Montesquieu; the Federalist, in particular James Madison’s Federalist No. 10;
and the Anti-Federalist.7 Important collateral influences include Blackstone’s
J.L. & LIBERTY 961 (2014). For an older work, see JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE
CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
2. See, e.g., DAVID E. BERNSTEIN, REHABILITATING LOCHNER: DEFENDING INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
AGAINST PROGRESSIVE REFORM (2011). See generally Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
3. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, THE CLASSICAL LIBERAL CONSTITUTION: THE UNCERTAIN QUEST
FOR LIMITED GOVERNMENT 45–71 (2014); see also id. at 53 (“In its enduring provisions, our
Constitution is most emphatically a classical liberal document.”).
4. Id. at 20 (“The grand social contract . . . at every stage . . . is meant to produce the same
win/win outcomes, just like ordinary contracts . . . .”).
5. Id. at 7.
6. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, THE OPENING OF AMERICAN LAW: NEOCLASSICAL LEGAL
THOUGHT, 1870–1970, at 243–62 (2015).
7. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 3 (referring to the works of Hobbes, Locke,
Montesquieu, and Hume); see also CHARLES DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (1748); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison, Nov. 22, 1787); THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (1651); DAVID
HUME, Of the Original Contract, in ESSAYS: MORAL, POLITICAL, AND LITERARY 465 (Eugene F. Miller
ed., Liberty Fund rev. ed. 1987); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER
CONCERNING TOLERATION (Ian Shapiro ed., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1690).
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conception of the centrality of the common law,8 as well as Adam Smith’s
views about the importance of the free market over government interference.9
Markets have an esteemed place in the classical Constitution. They come
closer than any institution to realizing the social contract’s ideal, namely, the
movement of resources only by the consent of all affected parties.
The resulting constitutionalism is wary of legislation as excessively
vulnerable to special-interest capture, suspicious of non-unanimous direct
democracy tools, such as initiatives and referenda, because of their propensity
to disrespect individual rights,10 and severely critical of most forms of
economic regulation, including protective labor legislation. With this distrust
of legislation comes a reliance on judges to get the right answer by applying
classical liberal principles, striking down statutes as unconstitutional even
when the court’s mandate is not explicitly stated in any constitutional
language.
Today the most common foil for classical liberal constitutionalism is the
“progressive” constitution. For example, Richard Epstein writes of a
“Progressive Response” that vanquished a classical liberal constitutionalism
that he believes was dominant for roughly 150 years.11 This progressive
synthesis replaced classicism with broad judicial deference to legislatures on
matters of economic regulation, typically under rational basis or other
comparatively weak tests. Progressive constitutionalism also favors or is at least
benign toward state involvement in the redistribution of wealth, guarantees
of entitlements, and economic regulation of markets. It tolerates the use of
regulatory agencies to extend executive power into areas traditionally within
the scope of the Federal Constitution’s Article I’s legislative power or Article
III’s judicial power.12
In the 1970s, both centrist and more left-leaning legal historians began
to argue that “classical legal thought” dominated American legal theory from
the mid-1800s to the early 1900s, but gradually gave way to “progressive legal
thought.”13 This writing produced a paradigm for thinking about the history

8. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 84, 318, 323. See generally WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES.
9. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 150, 582. See generally ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (Edwin Cannon ed., Methuen & Co. 5th ed.
1904) (1776).
10. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 25, 137.
11. Id. at 34; see also David E. Bernstein, From Progressivism to Modern Liberalism: Louis D.
Brandeis as a Transitional Figure in Constitutional Law, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2029, 2029 n.1
(2014) (referring to “post-Lochner, pre-New Deal opponents of liberty of contract, and other preNew Deal proponents of government activism, as ‘Progressives’”).
12. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 55.
13. See, e.g., MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960:
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 9–63 (1992); HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ENTERPRISE AND
AMERICAN LAW, 1836–1937 (1991). Prior to 1980, a widely circulated unpublished book
manuscript by Duncan Kennedy developed the term. It was eventually published as DUNCAN
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of elite legal thought in the United States that dominates to this day. It created
the impression that “progressives” developed a new approach to legal
thought, while conservatives clung to historical classicism. This paradigm has
been used both by defenders of progressive legal theory and by those who
defend the classical position while decrying the progressive revolution.14
While these historians were correct about the relatively late arrival of
classical legal thought, in other respects they seriously overstated their case.
The developers of the progressive model created a false image of reaction, or
of conservatives who resisted legal change by clinging to classical ideology. In
fact, conservatives and moderates during the late 19th and early 20th
centuries were just as revisionist as the people we style “progressives,”
although the conservatives’ and moderates’ revisions often went in different
directions.15
I write here as a legal historian and (as best I can) take no position on
substantive questions of political ideology or constitutional interpretation.
With that caveat, this Article argues, first, that the Constitution was not
classical in its inception. Rather, the classical Constitution was invented
decades later. The historical constitution was “pre-classical,” particularly on
matters of private contract and property rights and on government
encouragement of economic development. That conclusion is consistent with
the Constitution’s text but even clearer from contemporary perspectives and
early judicial interpretations. Similar developments occurred in private law,
where the anti-monopolistic, laissez faire doctrines that characterized 19thcentury legal classicism actually came into existence 40 or more years after
the Constitution was ratified.16
Second, a more distinctively “classical” perspective on the Constitution
developed, as the influence of Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nations and his English
and American followers, filtered through American academies and
institutions of government. More classical views grew largely out of the

KENNEDY, THE RISE AND FALL OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT (2006). See also SUSAN ROSEACKERMAN, RETHINKING THE PROGRESSIVE AGENDA: THE REFORM OF THE AMERICAN REGULATORY
STATE (1992); WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE LOST WORLD OF CLASSICAL LEGAL THOUGHT: LAW AND
IDEOLOGY IN AMERICA, 1886–1937 (1998); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law
Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685, 1725 n.90 (1976); Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical
Understanding of Legal Consciousness: The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850–1940, 3
RES. L. & SOC. 3 (1980).
14. E.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 55; see also sources cited supra note 13.
15. This is an important theme in HOVENKAMP, supra note 6. See also Herbert Hovenkamp,
Progressive Legal Thought, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 653, 654–61 (2015) (disputing the proposition
that the principal counter to classical constitutionalism is progressive legal thought).
16. E.g., HORWITZ, supra note 13, at 31–62 (discussing property rights); id. at 63–74
(discussing just compensation); id. at 74–99 (reviewing nuisance, punitive damages and
negligence); id. at 160–210 (explaining the transition from equitable to laissez faire conceptions of
contract); id. at 211–52 (presenting the concept of negotiability and emergence of commercial law).
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Jacksonian movement, which began to take hold in the early 1830s.17 These
views appeared in federal constitutional doctrine with Jackson’s 1836
appointment of Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, an economic liberal. Classical
liberal views increasingly influenced both state and federal constitutional
thought well into the 20th century although state courts interpreting their
own constitutions often led the way. The evolving positions included a strong
antiregulatory bias favoring private markets, suspicion of monopoly both
inside and outside the patent system, legislative-capture justifications for
judicial review, a strong view of liberty of contract, and the
constitutionalization of the employee-at-will rule, which effectively turned the
employment relationship into a species of commercial contract.18 As these
doctrines expanded, however, constitutional doctrine began to depart more
significantly from constitutional texts and collateral historical sources.
Jacksonians were interventionist on questions of morals.19 Indeed, the
Jackson and post-Jackson periods are characterized by a significant increase
in government regulation of conduct thought to be immoral, compensating
for a splintered and more pluralistic Christian Church that was rapidly losing
its political hegemony. Considering its record on both economics and morals,
the Jacksonian movement cannot be described as libertarian. These views
were reflected not only in legislation and judicial decisions, but also in the
great constitutional treatise writers of the post-Civil War Era: Thomas M.
Cooley, John F. Dillon, Christopher Tiedeman, and Francis Wharton. All of
these writers preached a strong version of laissez faire in areas of business, and
equally strong interventionism in matters of morals, supporting harsh
regulation of lotteries, alcohol consumption, and even offenses that had few
identifiable victims, such as Sabbath breaking and blasphemy.20
In making this argument for a late-arising “classical” interpretation of the
Constitution, the discussion here devotes relatively little attention to the rise
of the economic substantive due process doctrine, which has been extensively
discussed by many historians.21 While opinions differ about the origins of
economic substantive due process, no one (as far as I know) dates it earlier

17. See generally CHARLES SELLERS, THE MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA, 1815–1846
(1991).
18. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 268–69.
19. See id. at 243–63.
20. Id. at 254–56; see also KYLE G. VOLK, MORAL MINORITIES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
DEMOCRACY 3–5, 37, 58 (2014).
21. E.g., VIII OWEN M. FISS, TROUBLED BEGINNINGS OF THE MODERN STATE, 1888–1910, at
48–49, 82 (1993); see, e.g., PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK: ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL
(1998); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 STAN. L. REV. 379
(1988) (discussing conventional theories about the development of economic substantive due
process and describing the impact of transforming scientific world views on the doctrine); David
N. Mayer, The Myth of “Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism”: Liberty of Contract During the Lochner Era, 36
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 217 (2009) (synthesizing recent economic substantive due process
scholarship and liberty-of-contract jurisprudence).
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than Chief Justice Taney’s 1852 decision, Bloomer v. McQuewan, a case arising
under the federal Patent Act.22
After a brief discussion of judicial review and the Commerce Clause prior
to the Classical Period, I turn to legal and economic doctrine that has been
less well represented in the literature. One instance is the growing hostility of
19th-century classical constitutionalists to Marshall Era Contract Clause
jurisprudence, which limited the State’s power to modify already executed
contracts. Classicists also developed a laissez faire “public purpose” doctrine
limiting the activities for which public governments could tax and that, to
some extent, anticipated economic substantive due process.23 Another
important development was the rise of the “inverse” condemnation doctrine,
which required compensation for injuries to private property caused by statesanctioned economic development when there was no assertion of eminent
domain power. The principal legal vehicle for this was amendments to state
constitutions that occurred in the 1870s.24 Yet another, which I have
addressed in a different paper, is the emergence of a “classical,” largely
administrative federal patent law system that took the issuance of patent
“monopolies” away from state legislatures, where they were excessively prone
to special-interest capture. In the process, however, the patent system was
recast as a set of property rights whose definition and scope were largely
isolated from concerns about economic development. That economic
isolationism has affected patent law ever since.25
Third, one element thought by some to be central to classical political
theory, the “social contract,” never played much of a role in American
constitutional development prior to the mid-20th century, not even during
the period of the Constitution’s formation or the earliest interpretation of
Lochner or its later heyday. While judges and constitutional writers often spoke
of a social “contract” or “compact,” they were almost always referring to the
text of a state constitution, the United States Constitution, or some other
authoritative document. They rarely advocated for a social contract doctrine
that would enable them to move beyond the ratified text to some unstated
fundamental principle. Attempts to do so were regularly repudiated. Even the
academic and judicial architects of economic substantive due process during
the Gilded Age and Progressive Era did not typically rely on the social contract
idea, and some forcefully rejected it.26
Fourth, and finally, the idea that the classical constitutional doctrine was
displaced by “progressive” constitutionalism is also wrong, or at least wildly
22. See Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. 539, 547–48 (1852); see also Herbert Hovenkamp,
The Emergence of Classical American Patent Law, ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), http://ssrn.com/
abstract=2625596.
23. See infra Part III.C and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text.
25. Hovenkamp, supra note 22, at 25.
26. See infra Part IV.
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exaggerated. The constitutional revolution that occurred during the first four
decades of the 20th century was certainly supported by self-identified
“progressives.” But support for change was actually broader and much more
centrist, better described by the term “neoclassical” than “progressive.”
“Neoclassical” refers to revolutionary movements in many disciplines “that
[are] derivative of an earlier ‘classical’ period,” accepting many of its values
and forms but contributing something new, as well.27 Further, the
contributions were revisionist, often reformulating well-established ideas in
ways that the classicists themselves would have rejected. For example,
neoclassical economics in the late 19th and early 20th century preserved
classicism’s faith in markets and even some of its technical doctrine. However,
it rejected classicism’s tendency to determine value from past averages,
substituting a forward-looking theory of value based on rational expectations.
The results were a rejection of classicism’s backward-looking and heavily
historicist views, greater sophistication about risk and its management, and a
broader conception of market failure.28 Neoclassical legal thought largely
followed the same course, severely qualifying but never rejecting the common
law and doing the same thing for traditional property and contract rights.
Business policy, while hardly “progressive” overall, became thoroughly
neoclassical. By about 1930, most economists were marginalist; only a subset
were progressives.
II. THE HISTORICAL CONSTITUTION
The founding parent of classical economic theory in the Anglo-American
tradition is, of course, Adam Smith. His Wealth of Nations was published in
1776, on the eve of the American Revolution. After examining the record of
the Constitution’s founding, however, the influential mid-20th century
historian Clinton Rossiter concluded that “[t]he laissez-faire principles of
Adam Smith were no part of the American consensus in 1787,” the year of the
Constitutional Convention.29 A generation later, with a little more
qualification, Garry Wills largely agreed.30
Rossiter’s categorical statement was an exaggeration. The first American
printing of The Wealth of Nations was in 1789, but it had been written in English
and was widely available in the United States prior to then.31 Nevertheless, the
records of the Constitutional Convention include no references to it. Nor is
there any explicit reference to Smith or his book in The Federalist. Adam Smith
was unpopular among many of the Constitution’s Federalist supporters
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 2; see also id. at 3–4.
Id. at 4–7.
CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 69 (1966).
See GARRY WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 17, 20, 68–69, 202 (1981).
See William Letwin, The Economic Policy of the Constitution, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 121, 131 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman
eds., 1989).
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because he was British.32 By contrast, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison
both read and admired The Wealth of Nations, and there is some evidence that
Madison relied on Smith even though Madison never cited him.33 Other
contemporaries knew who Smith was and owned his book, but many, such as
Hamilton, particularly in his Report on Manufactures, rejected its laissez faire
theory in favor of one favoring governmental support for economic
development.34
Smith opposed the use of government inducements to encourage
economic development, particularly state-sanctioned monopolies or other
privileges granted to corporations.35 Six state delegations36 to the
Constitutional Convention unsuccessfully urged a provision prohibiting the
federal government, although not the states, from making monopoly grants
in order to further development. Two years later, James Madison successfully
resisted attempts to have such a provision included in the Bill of Rights.37
The legal ancestor of this early and unsuccessful anti-monopoly
movement was the English Statute of Monopolies, which had been enacted in
1623, long before either John Locke or Adam Smith.38 The American states
were concerned about a centralized federal power to create monopolies that
might injure individual states, rather than with state power to create their own
monopolies, which would benefit the granting states. Indeed, during the postratification period nearly every state enthusiastically issued monopoly grants
in its own corporate charters. Massachusetts and New York led the way in state
grants of monopoly charters, even though they had opposed federal power to
create monopolies.39 By contrast, an anti-monopoly provision did make its way
into the Revolutionary Era North Carolina Constitution, although it was

32. See Edward G. Bourne, Alexander Hamilton and Adam Smith, 8 Q.J. ECON. 328, 329 (1894)
(arguing that Hamilton’s Report on Manufactures tracked Smith and paraphrased him but did not
cite him because as an English political economist, Smith was unpopular in Hamilton’s circles).
33. Samuel Fleischacker believes there were one or two implicit references not mentioning
Smith’s name. See Samuel Fleischacker, Adam Smith’s Reception Among the American Founders, 1776–1790,
59 WM. & MARY Q. 897, 903 (2002). Thomas Jefferson’s personal copies of Wealth of Nations can be
viewed at Wealth of Nations, MONTICELLO, http://www.monticello.org/site/research-and-collections/
wealth-nations (last visited Sept. 21, 2015).
34. See Fleischacker, supra note 33, at 902 n.6 (citing ALEXANDER HAMILTON, REPORT ON
MANUFACTURES (1791)). On Hamilton’s differences with Smith, see generally PETER MCNAMARA,
POLITICAL ECONOMY AND STATESMANSHIP: SMITH, HAMILTON, AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE
COMMERCIAL REPUBLIC (1998).
35. See Fleischacker, supra note 33, at 905.
36. The delegations came from New Hampshire, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina,
Virginia, and Rhode Island. Steven G. Calabresi & Larissa C. Leibowitz, Monopolies and the
Constitution: A History of Crony Capitalism, 36 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 983, 1013 (2013).
37. Id. at 1014.
38. See English Statute of Monopolies 1623, 21 Jac. 1, c. 3.
39. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 18–23, 27.
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apparently never used to strike down an exclusive grant in a corporate
charter.40
Two generations later things had changed dramatically. The Jacksonian
movement sharply heightened the concern about both state- and federally
created monopolies, as well as other special privileges for favored business
interests. In fact, hostility toward monopoly in nearly every economic area
became a defining characteristic of the emergent Jacksonian movement, with
effects that have never entirely dissipated. Indeed, one of Epstein’s strong
objections to progressive New Deal policy is to its use of regulatory process to
protect “favored, entrenched monopolies.”41
The United States Constitution was written at an important transitional
time in the history of western political and economic thought. To the extent
the Constitution reflects a theory of economics and government intervention,
it came mainly from the predecessors of classical economic thought. What
little the Framers’ generation derived from Adam Smith was not the central
principles about markets and government that we today associate with
classical thought. Rather, Smith’s influence pertained to more marginal issues
such as the wisdom of having a standing army, which Smith favored;42 “the
important distinction between ‘direct’ and ‘indirect’ taxation,” which
occasioned the Supreme Court’s first citation of an economic text;43 the
importance of separation of church and state;44 the profligacy of monarchs;45
and Smith’s preference for farming over manufacturing.46 Although Madison
did not cite Smith, there are some parallels between Madison’s views in
Federalist No. 10 concerning the competition among different interest groups
(“factions”) and Smith’s arguments based on competition among various
religious sects in England.47
American colleges and schools in the early national period developed
almost no “indigenous” theory of political economy. The discipline was taught
as a branch of moral philosophy, and with British and a few Continental

40. N.C. CONST. art. XXIII (1776) (“That perpetuities and monopolies are contrary to the
genius of a free State and ought not to be allowed.”); see also Minge v. Gilmour, 17 F. Cas. 440,
444, 446 (C.C.D.C.N.C. 1798) (No. 9631) (relying on this provision to hold that the fee tail
estate did not exist in North Carolina). See generally Joshua C. Tate, Perpetuities and the Genius of a
Free State, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1823 (2014) (observing North Carolina’s unique history as proprietary
land grant colony that gave rise to perpetuities issues).
41. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 37.
42. Fleischacker, supra note 33, at 904.
43. Id. at 905; see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 180–81 (1796) (quoting
Wealth of Nations on the difference between a tax on revenues and a tax on expenses).
44. Fleischacker, supra note 33, at 905, 907 (discussing Smith’s influence on Madison with
regard to the separation of church and state).
45. Id.
46. Id. at 906.
47. Id. at 910.
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texts.48 The economic views that dominated in late 18th-century America
favored active government involvement in managing the economy and
creating infrastructure. More laissez faire beliefs were outliers.
Daniel Raymond, a Federalist and lawyer by training, authored the only
comprehensive American treatise on political economy prior to the Jackson
era.49 He defended the monopoly grants:
A nation may be desirous of establishing some useful
manufactory, or to open some new source of trade, which is
expected to be useful and important to the nation, at some future
period; and for the attainment of these objects, it may be expedient
to create a private monopoly for a limited period. This monopoly
may be granted to a single individual, to a company, to a
corporation, or to some particular town; and although the rest of the
nation may be excluded from the benefit of it, still as the object is to
promote national interests, and as it is the duty of every citizen to
forego his own private advantage for the public good, no one will
have a right to complain.50
Alexander Hamilton also believed that beneficial private investment in
many forms of enterprise and technology could be facilitated through the use
of monopoly grants or other inducements.51 By contrast, the anti-Federalists
opposed the Constitution in part because they believed that it permitted the
federal government to create monopolies.52 Both Raymond’s and Hamilton’s
positions were consistent with a long colonial history of using subsidies and
exclusive grants in order to further economic development.53
In his later book, Elements of Constitutional Law and of Political Economy,
Daniel Raymond flatly rejected as “absurd” the ascendant classical view that
state-sanctioned exclusive privileges benefitted the rich at the expense of the

48. See 2 JOSEPH DORFMAN, THE ECONOMIC MIND IN AMERICAN CIVILIZATION, 1606–1865, at
512–15 (1946).
49. Id. at 566–73.
50. DANIEL RAYMOND, THOUGHTS ON POLITICAL ECONOMY: IN TWO PARTS 326 (1820).
51. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 18; Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust Antifederalism, 96 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 7–8 (2008). On the reaction of Jeffersonians to Federalist Era political economy, see generally
DREW R. MCCOY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC: POLITICAL ECONOMY IN JEFFERSONIAN AMERICA (1980).
52. See James Winthrop, Agrippa, IX, MASS. GAZETTE, Dec. 28, 1787, reprinted in ESSAYS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE,
1787–1788, at 80 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1892) (James Winthrop is attributed as the author,
but authorship has not been conclusively established); see also JOHN DICKINSON, Two Letters on the
Tea Tax, in I THE WRITINGS OF JOHN DICKINSON: POLITICAL WRITINGS, 1764–1774, at 457–60
(Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1895); Robert Yates, Address by Sydney, reprinted in 6 THE COMPLETE ANTIFEDERALIST 107, 112 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (writing under the pseudonym “Sydney”).
Yates also used the pseudonym “Brutus.”
53. Oren Bracha, Owning Ideas: A History of Anglo-American Intellectual Property 97–116
(June 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard Law School), http://www.utexas.edu/law/
faculty/obracha/dissertation.
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poor.54 Although monopolies may increase consumer prices, these effects are
“more than counterbalanced” by higher wages.55 In his Commentaries on the
Constitution of the United States, Justice Story agreed, arguing that exclusive
rights in corporate charters for the construction of toll bridges or other works
of public improvement were absolutely essential in order to guarantee an
adequate return on investment.56
American governments have always been involved in economic
development and creation of infrastructure, although both the amount and
the nature of their involvement changed over time.57 Overall, southern states
tended to be more laissez faire than the northeastern seaboard, mainly because
of the South’s greater reliance on agriculture and slavery.58 Most government
economic intervention in the 19th century did not involve direct
management by government agencies, because these did not yet exist.
Infrastructure was typically financed through public grants of land, monopoly
provisions, tax exemptions, or other perquisites in exchange for a corporate
charter that obligated the corporation to build and operate the contemplated
work.59 For example, the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 required the
Commonwealth to use “rewards and immunities, for the promotion of
agriculture, arts, sciences, commerce, trades, [and] manufactures.”60
Notwithstanding its position during the ratification debates that the federal
government should be prohibited from creating monopolies, Massachusetts
developed a strong tradition of using monopoly corporate charters in its own
grants to encourage economic development.61 Other states did the same
thing.62
Some public works required more explicit financial support. In the early
national period, lotteries were often used to fund public-works projects.63

54. DANIEL RAYMOND, ELEMENTS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 223
(4th ed. 1840).
55. Id.
56. 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833).
57. E.g., OSCAR HANDLIN & MARY FLUG HANDLIN, COMMONWEALTH: A STUDY OF THE ROLE
OF GOVERNMENT IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY: MASSACHUSETTS, 1774–1861 (rev. ed. 1969);
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 17–41; JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND ECONOMIC GROWTH: THE
LEGAL HISTORY OF THE LUMBER INDUSTRY IN WISCONSIN, 1836–1915 (1964); WILLIAM E. NELSON,
AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS
SOCIETY, 1760–1830 (Univ. of Ga. Press 1994) (1975). See also EPSTEIN, supra note 3, who
acknowledges a role for the State in supporting infrastructure, id. at 42–43, but also concludes
that the difference between classicists and progressives was their attitude toward state-created
monopoly. Id. at 36.
58. See 2 DORFMAN, supra note 48, at 527–65.
59. HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 17–41.
60. MASS. CONST., ch. V, § 2 (1780).
61. HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 57, at 68–77, 177–79, 212–13.
62. HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 17–25; WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE: LAW
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 1–55 (1996).
63. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 256–59.
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During the Jackson era, Christian evangelicals attacked lotteries on moral
grounds, and governments turned to more secular revenue sources, such as
municipal bonds. The bonds were issued to the public and then used either
to purchase corporate stock or to finance outright grants to corporations for
construction.64 Failure rates were very high, creating the impression that bond
issuance was nothing more than a boondoggle, largely intended to benefit
railroads at the public’s expense.65 In a very real sense, the municipal bond
cases, many of which went to the Supreme Court, soured both citizens and
government decision makers about public investment, paving the way for
economic substantive due process doctrine.66 But these were mid-century
developments, occurring many decades after the Constitution had been
ratified.
III. THE ORIGINS OF THE CLASSICAL CONSTITUTION
Richard Epstein’s The Classical Liberal Constitution is a masterpiece of
constitutional interpretation. Nevertheless, Epstein’s book is quite revealing
for its discussion of case law and legislation prior to the Jackson Era. Epstein
focuses mainly on the Federal Constitution, not those from the states. But, in
contradiction to his thesis that the Constitution was classical liberal from its
founding, his own book reveals a much later development and very little
evidence that either the Framers or early constitutional interpretation
supported his positions.
To be sure, already in 1803 Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury
v. Madison justified judicial review of federal legislation.67 This doctrine is to
Epstein’s liking because the judiciary should have wide berth to overturn
statutes that interfere with liberty of contract or other rights in property or
person. In the process, however, Epstein reveals just how many edges the
sword of judicial review can have: it encompasses John Marshall’s style of
expansionist reasoned elaboration, the Lochner Era which Epstein admires,
and of course the expansions of the Warren Court, which he does not. Each
of these interpreted the text within an underlying framework about the
appropriate role of government, but the frameworks were very different.
Chief Justice Marshall himself did not use judicial review to accomplish the
purposes Epstein had in mind, but largely in the service of expansive federal
power and coordinate limits on state power.68
One unifying theme of classical constitutionalism was that people should
have maximum freedom to bargain and to keep the property they lawfully

64. HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 36–41.
65. See generally L.A. Powe, Jr., Rehearsal for Substantive Due Process: The Municipal Bond Cases,
53 TEX. L. REV. 738 (1975).
66. Id.
67. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 77–90.
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acquired, consistent with the state’s obligation to control immoral conduct or
protect health and safety. A second theme was that government’s role in
furthering economic development should be limited and passive, focusing on
protection of property rights and not the creation of monopolies or other
exclusive privileges. Many of the great takings controversies in postFourteenth Amendment Supreme Court jurisprudence have involved either
conflicts between private-property ownership and a sovereign’s power to
promote economic development,69 or else government control of private
development’s spillovers, such as environmental harm or destruction of
historically significant structures.70 The classical constitutional revolution
redefined the concept of “monopoly” more broadly so as to include many
government interventions in the unregulated market, whether or not they
actually threatened monopoly. For example, in 1910 the New York Court of
Appeals invalidated a law that required an apprenticeship and license for
undertakers, citing the threat of monopoly.71 While the Act added a training
requirement, it did not limit the number of people who could be undertakers,
and the court cited no fact that suggested monopoly was threatened.
These changes all occurred long after John Marshall’s passing, however,
and required dismantling of a great deal of his jurisprudence. First, it gave
effect to classical ideas that required narrowing the federal commerce power
so as to reduce the role of the federal government in economic
development—largely the opposite of what the Marshall Court had done.72
Second was a reversal of the Contract Clause doctrine created under Chief
Justice Marshall, which classical critics saw as government approval of
entrenched monopoly.73 Third, property rights had to be expanded so as to
go beyond the traditional concerns of eminent domain law, which were
seizure of title or forced occupancy.74 Fourth, at both the state and federal
levels, an important constitutional hook for executing these changes was the
rise of a “substantive” conception of due process that carried that idea’s

69. E.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005) (involving urban development);
Loretto v Teleprompter Manhattan CATV, 458 U.S. 419 (1982) (regarding municipal policy
permitting cable television lines to cross private property); Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)
(involving urban development); St. Louis v. W. Union Tel. Co., 148 U.S. 92 (1893) (discussing
construction of telegraph lines); Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871)
(examining government construction of a dam that was flooding petitioner’s property).
70. E.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994) (controlling harmful private
development); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (discussing wetlands
protection); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987) (controlling allegedly harmful
private development); Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (involving
historic landmark preservation); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926)
(examining comprehensive use and density restrictions).
71. People v. Ringe, 90 N.E. 451, 454 (1910).
72. See infra Part III.A and text accompanying notes 95–99.
73. See infra text accompanying notes 122–49.
74. See infra text accompanying notes 187–208.
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meaning beyond its traditional concern with fair procedure, or decisions
made in accordance with the existing “law of the land.”75 A fifth change came
in patent law, which took patent granting authority away from state
legislatures and switched the focus of patent law away from promoting
economic development toward the creation of a set of property rights that an
inventor could assert or not at its pleasure.76
A. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE FROM MARSHALL TO TANEY
Chief Justice Marshall’s broad interpretation of the federal commerce
power so as to limit state legislation that affected interstate commerce
strengthened the role of the federal government in economic development.
By contrast, the later rise of classical “dual federalism” created a hard,
although somewhat indistinct, line between intrastate activities that are out of
Congress’s reach, and interstate commerce that is exclusively in Congress’s
control.77
Gibbons v. Ogden, which was a Commerce Clause challenge to a stateissued steamboat patent, held that New York had no authority to create a
domestic monopoly route that interfered with a federal license to operate in
interstate navigable waters.78 This problem of competing state and interstate
routes would arise often in the railroad industry in the late 19th century, and
provoked numerous Commerce Clause battles during the period of dual
federalism.79 The exclusivity provision in the New York patent extended to the
full boundaries of the state, although not beyond. One consequence was to
make it impossible for people from Connecticut and New Jersey to travel to
New York by steamboat, because the New York monopoly foreclosed
outsiders’ access to New York ports.80
The Supreme Court held that the New York patent unconstitutionally
interfered with interstate commerce. John Marshall’s opinion established two
things: first, that the word “commerce” in the constitutional clause should be
construed broadly so as to include navigation “as expressly granted, as if that
term had been added to the word ‘commerce.’”81 Further, the term reaches
much further than “trade”:
Commerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more: it is
intercourse. It describes the commercial intercourse between
nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, and is regulated by
75. See infra text accompanying notes 122–23, 149–50, 283–301.
76. See Hovenkamp, supra note 22.
77. See generally Felix Frankfurter, Taney and the Commerce Clause, 49 HARV. L. REV. 1286 (1936).
78. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 240 (1824); see also infra text accompanying
notes 81–94.
79. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Regulatory Conflict in the Gilded Age: Federalism and the
Railroad Problem, 97 YALE L.J. 1017 (1988).
80. P.J. Federico, State Patents, 13 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 166, 175–77 (1931).
81. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 193.
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prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse. The mind can
scarcely conceive a system for regulating commerce between
nations, which shall exclude all laws concerning navigation, which
shall be silent on the admission of the vessels of the one nation into
the ports of the other, and be confined to prescribing rules for the
conduct of individuals, in the actual employment of buying and
selling, or of barter.82
The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate not only
commerce “with” foreign nations and the Indian tribes, but also “among” the
several states. Unlike many later advocates for a narrow reading, Chief Justice
Marshall understood the differing meanings of “between” and “among”—a
distinction that 19th-century writers took much more seriously than we do
today. The word “between” is transactional and refers to movement from one
place to another, such as commerce between Iowa and Illinois. The
Constitution uses “between” in this transactional sense when it creates
diversity jurisdiction over controversies “between” the citizens of different
states83—that is, a plaintiff from one state suing a defendant from a different
state.84 If the drafters of the Constitution had intended to limit the commerce
power to interstate shipment, they would have used the phrase: “Commerce
between the several states.” On the other hand, as Chief Justice Marshall
observed:
The word ‘among’ means intermingled with. A thing which is among
others, is intermingled with them. Commerce among the States,
cannot stop at the external boundary line of each State, but may be
introduced into the interior.85
“Comprehensive as the word ‘among’ is,” Marshall added, “it may very
properly be restricted to that commerce which concerns more States than
one.”86 Epstein reads this phrase as importing a requirement limiting the
power to movement across state lines.87 Read in context, it means just the

82. Id. at 189–90; see also The Wilson, 30 F. Cas. 239, 242–43 (Marshall, Circuit Justice,
C.C.D. Va. 1820) (No. 17, 846) (“From the adoption of the constitution, till this time, the
universal sense of America has been, that the word ‘commerce,’ as used in that instrument, is to
be considered a generic term, comprehending navigation, or, that a control over navigation is
necessarily incidental to the power to regulate commerce.”).
83. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
84. On the historical importance of the “between”/“among” distinction, see generally
Herbert Hovenkamp, Essay, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The Supreme Court’s
Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213 (1996).
85. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194.
86. Id. (emphasis added); see also, e.g., N. River Steamboat Co. v. Livingston, 3 Wheeler C.C.
483 (C.C.N.Y 1825) (divided (22–9)) (relying on this passage to hold that even purely intrastate
monopoly routes along navigable rivers, such as New York to Albany, violate the Commerce
Clause).
87. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 154–55.
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opposite. “Concerns” means about the same thing as “affects,” or something
in which they have an interest. This is the predominant usage of the term
“concern” in The Federalist, written during the period between the
Constitution’s drafting and ratification.88 Chief Justice Marshall gave this
explanation:
The genius and character of the whole government seem to be, that
its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation,
and to those internal concerns which affect the States generally; but
not to those which are completely within a particular State, which do
not affect other States, and with which it is not necessary to interfere,
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the
government. The completely internal commerce of a State, then,
may be considered as reserved for the State itself.89
This was nearly as strong a statement of “affecting commerce” as might be
found in decisions a century and a half later. The exclusivity provision in New
York’s steamboat patent affected trade along a partially competing interstate
route, and that was all that was required. Marshall then added that “the power
to regulate” commerce
is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent, and
acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the
constitution. These are expressed in plain terms, and do not affect
the questions which arise in this case, or which have been discussed
at the bar. If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of
Congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several States, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would be
in a single government, having in its constitution the same
restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the
constitution of the United States.90

88. E.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 70 (James Madison, Nov. 30, 1787) (Oxford Univ. Press
2008) (stating that power to make laws is “limited to certain enumerated objects, which concern
all the members of the republic”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 232 (James Madison, Jan. 26, 1788)
(Oxford Univ. Press 2008) (“[P]owers reserved to the several States will extend to all the objects
which, in the ordinary course of affairs, concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the
people . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 388 (Alexander Hamilton, June 21, 1788) (Oxford
Univ. Press 2008) (stating that judicial power extends to cases “which concern the execution of
the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union”).
89. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 195.
90. Id. at 196–97. Speaking five years later in Wilson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S.
245 (1829), the Chief Justice saw no problem with a federal statute that controlled internal
navigation “over those small navigable creeks into which the tide flows.” Id. at 252. However, the
Court then found that a state could lawfully erect a dam on such a creek when Congress had not
regulated at all. Id.
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States rightists were livid. “Do we not know that . . . more danger is now
to be apprehended from tyranny in the head than from anarchy in the
extremities?” Congressman Andrew Stevenson of Virginia complained in
colorful federalist language in a House Report on traffic and navigation.91 “Do
we suppose that the people are willing to abandon their State governments as
useless corporations?”92 As a result of the decision, “[w]e are now sweeping
down at one blow the independence and power of the State Governments.”93
As the great Supreme Court historian Charles Warren wrote in the 1920s, the
steamboat case “marked another step in the broad construction of the
Constitution, and became at once a mighty weapon in the hands of those
statesmen who favored projects requiring the extension of Federal
authority.”94
The Marshall Court’s Commerce Clause analysis presents a sharp
contrast to that of the Jackson Era. This revolution was abetted by Jackson’s
1836 appointment of his former Attorney General, Maryland Catholic Roger
Brooks Taney, to be Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Constitutional
scholar Edward S. Corwin gave the name “dual federalism” to the wall that the
Taney Court created between federal and state power, recognizing broad state
freedom to regulate internally, even if the regulations affected interstate
commerce.95 For example, Taney’s opinion for the Court in the License Cases
refused to find any limitation on state power to tax goods in commerce once
they had arrived in the state.96 He made this point even more forcefully two
years later in his dissent from the Court’s 5–4 decision in the Passenger Cases,
which struck down state attempts to tax incoming ships based on the number
of passengers that disembarked.97 There, Taney concluded that the federal
commerce power clearly did not extend over “the intercourse of persons
passing from one State to another.”98 He continued:
And if Congress, under its power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations, possesses the power claimed for it in the decision of this
case, the same course of reasoning and the same rule of construction
(by substituting intercourse for commerce) would give the general

91. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 1267 (1824) (Joseph Gales ed., 1856).
92. Id.
93. 2 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 77 (Beard Books
1999) (1922).
94. Id. at 76.
95. See generally Edward S. Corwin, Congress’s Power to Prohibit Commerce: A Crucial
Constitutional Issue, 18 CORN. L.Q. 477 (1933); Edward S. Corwin, The Passing of Dual Federalism,
36 VA. L. REV. 1 (1950).
96. The License Cases, 46 U.S. 504 (1847) (involving principally Massachusetts, Rhode
Island, and New Hampshire in which a divided Court upheld the power of these states to regulate
the sale of liquor that had been imported from outside the state).
97. The Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. 283 (1849).
98. Id. at 493.
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government the same power over the intercourse of persons
between different States.99
One important difference between Marshall Era Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and dual federalism lay in the inability of the latter to control
state regulatory “spillovers.” Many nominally intrastate practices, such as
transport route exclusivity that extended to the border, affected surrounding
states or the relationship between states—a phenomenon well known to
Gilded Age railroad economists.100 Writing in 1908, Woodrow Wilson
criticized the maze of inconsistent state regulations that, while enforced
exclusively within their individual boundaries, were creating a patchwork that
imposed considerable costs on interstate business.101 In Chief Justice
Marshall’s view, the federal government had the power to control for these.
Dual federalism was much more resistant. For example, the E.C. Knight
antitrust decision, during the heyday of dual federalism in the 1880s, refused
to apply federal antitrust law to condemn a monopoly of sugar intended for
transport into other states.102 Limiting the Marshall Era Gibbons decision, the
Supreme Court stated that “Commerce succeeds to manufacture, and is not a
part of it.”103 Chief Justice Fuller’s majority opinion indicated that each state,
not the federal government, was empowered to relieve its citizens from the
burdens of monopoly.104 But that stated the economic concern backwards.
The government’s lawsuit was predicated on the fact that the sugar was being
shipped outside the state. New York, the producing state, was the beneficiary
of the monopoly, which was visiting its harm elsewhere.
The same thing was largely true of Hammer v. Daghenhart, the 1918
decision striking down a federal child labor statute that applied only to goods
destined for shipment across a state line within 30 days of their
manufacture.105 The non-progressive Justice Holmes’ dissent made the point
that the statute merely regulated what could be shipped across a state line—
something that clearly would have fallen within Chief Justice Marshall’s vision
of the commerce power.106 That was a point that subsequent critics have
missed:107 Congress was not regulating child labor; it was regulating the
99. Id. at 494.
100. See Robert Mather, How the States Make Interstate Rates, 32 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 95, 107–09 (1908); William Z. Ripley, The Trunk Line Rate System: A Distance Tariff, 20 Q.J.
ECON. 183, 183–84 (1906).
101. See generally Woodrow Wilson, The States and the Federal Government, 187 N. AM. REV. 684
(1908).
102. United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 16–18 (1895).
103. Id. at 12.
104. Id. at 11 (“The relief of the citizens of each State from the burden of monopoly and the evils
resulting from the restraint of trade among such citizens was left with the States to deal with . . . .”).
105. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 277–78.
107. See Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 101,
115–16 (2001).
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interstate movement of goods made with child labor, under a constitutional
provision that placed no limits on the rationale for the regulation.
In sum, there is little evidence of a “classical liberal” Commerce Clause
jurisprudence prior to the rise of the Taney Court in the 1830s, when dual
federalism took root and would dominate Commerce Clause jurisprudence
for the next century.
B. THE CONTRACT CLAUSE AND THE INVENTION OF THE LEGISLATIVE CAPTURE
DOCTRINE
Article I’s Contract Clause is one of the few express imitations on state
power in the original Constitution, including the pre-incorporation Bill of
Rights.108 The Contract Clause does not place any limit on state power to
control contracts to be made in the future, rather, it prohibits a state from
impairing an obligation created by a contract that was lawful at the time it was
made. As a result it never provided a defensible rationale for economic
substantive due process doctrine, which limited state power to limit contracts
to be made in the future.
Early on, Supreme Court Contract Clause jurisprudence divided into two
branches: private and public. The “private” branch applied to agreements
between private parties, most particularly creditor–debtor agreements. Under
this branch the Marshall Court substantially limited state debtor relief laws or
statutes that were thought to interfere with federal bankruptcy law.109 During
the Taney period, the Supreme Court did not relent from close scrutiny of
such statutes, frequently striking them down.110
By contrast, the “public” branch of Contract Clause jurisprudence dealt
with grants made by a state or subdivision to a private entity. Initially, Fletcher
v. Peck (1810) held that a state-issued deed to land was a contract that the state
legislature could not later rescind, even if it had been fraudulently induced.111
In the Dartmouth College case in 1819, the Marshall Court extended this rule
to a corporate charter, holding that once a state granted a charter it could not
be altered in a way disadvantageous to the grantees.112
The Dartmouth College doctrine quickly produced case law holding that
state inducements given to business corporations are irrevocable, except as
limited by the express terms of the grant. In order to finance infrastructure,
many states chartered private corporations to build such facilities as toll roads,
bridges and later railroads. The inducements provided in corporate charters

108. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
109. See, e.g., Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S.
(12 Wheat.) 213 (1827); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 17–35.
110. See generally Gantly’s Lessee v. Ewing, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 707 (1845); Bronson v. Kinzie,
42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
111. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, 142–43 (1810).
112. Trs. of Dartmouth Coll. v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 665–66 (1819).
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included such things as grants of free land, monopoly rights, tax exemptions,
bounties, eminent domain power, or other special privileges. All of this was
quite consistent with pre-classical, Hamiltonian statecraft, which believed that
capital would not naturally flow into profitable enterprises. Rather it had to
be induced by active government policy. Protection from competition was a
way of ensuring profitability. During the first two decades of the 19th century
the rate of such charter grants increased tenfold.113 Later in the century, after
the Dartmouth College doctrine had been significantly weakened, states
switched to more direct forms of financial inducement, typically financed by
pubic bonds.114
By contrast, classicists believed that capital would flow naturally into
profitable projects and that state initiatives were improper for two reasons.
First, even when they were well intentioned, states were not as good as markets
in determining if particular projects would be profitable. Second, politics
inevitably biased the state’s selection of recipients of this largesse, as well as its
scope. Maine’s Chief Justice John Appleton stated the classical position in
1871, in a decision holding that local governments did not have the authority
to grant subsidies to individuals to encourage investment in local industry:
Capital naturally gravitates to the best investment. If a particular
place or a special kind of manufacture promises large returns, the
capitalist will be little likely to hesitate in selecting the place and in
determining upon the manufacture. But whatever is done, whether
by the individual or the corporation, it is done with the same hope
and expectation with which the farmer plows his fields and sows his
grain,—the anticipated returns.115
By the 1820s a broad and diverse political movement opposed state
grants of monopoly charters and other special privileges in order to induce
investment. The opposition was clearly reflected in the four-party presidential
election of 1824, where Andrew Jackson captured 42% of the popular vote,
against 32% for John Quincy Adams, 13% for Henry Clay, and 13% for
William H. Crawford.116 The election went to the House of Representatives,
however, where an infamous “corrupt bargain” between Adams and Clay gave
Adams the presidency, making Clay Secretary of State. Four years later
Andrew Jackson got his revenge, winning the presidency with 56% of the
popular vote to Adams’ 44%.117
113. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 17–35. On the rapidly increasing rate of state grants, see
Gordon S. Wood, The Origins of Vested Rights in the Early Republic, 85 VA. L. REV. 1421, 1440–42 (1999).
114. See infra text accompanying notes 174–87.
115. In re Opinion of the Justices, 58 Me. 590, 592 (1871). On Appleton, see generally DAVID
M. GOLD, THE SHAPING OF NINETEENTH-CENTURY LAW: JOHN APPLETON AND RESPONSIBLE
INDIVIDUALISM (1990).
116. JOHN M. MURRIN et al., LIBERTY, EQUALITY, POWER: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE,
VOLUME I: TO 1877, at 254 (6th ed. 2014).
117. Id. at 257.
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No decision symbolizes the rise of classical constitutionalism better than
the Charles River Bridge case, where the new Chief Justice debated with Justice
Story whether corporate charters for the creation of public works should
imply a monopoly right protecting the investment from competition.118
Against Taney’s conclusion for the majority that “in grants by the public,
nothing passes by implication,”119 Federalist Story protested in dissent that
I can conceive of no surer plan to arrest all public improvements,
founded on private capital and enterprise, than to make the outlay
of that capital uncertain and questionable, both as to security and as
to productiveness. No man will hazard his capital in any enterprise,
in which, if there be a loss, it must be borne exclusively by himself;
and if there be success, he has not the slightest security of enjoying
the rewards of that success, for a single moment. If the government
means to invite its citizens to enlarge the public comforts and
conveniences, to establish bridges, or turnpikes, or canals, or
railroads, there must be some pledge, that the property will be safe;
that the enjoyment will be co-extensive with the grant; and that
success will not be the signal of a general combination to overthrow
its rights, and to take away its profits.120
In contrast to the Marshall Court, the Taney Court used every device at
its disposal to limit monopoly grants. Indeed, when he was Attorney General
to President Jackson, Taney had written a legal opinion concluding that states
did not have the power to grant permanent monopoly rights.121
By the time of Reconstruction, the Dartmouth College holding had been
almost completely upended. To see just how classical the Constitution’s
theory of economic development had become, one need only compare the
Charles River Bridge, case with the Slaughter-House Cases 35 years later. In Charles
River Bridge the plaintiffs made a serious challenge and obtained agreement
from the Court’s four ageing Federalists and Whigs that a corporate charter
implied a monopoly provision. By contrast, in the Slaughter-House Cases the
plaintiffs obtained four votes for the view that the Constitution forbade a state
from placing a monopoly grant in a corporate charter for a slaughterhouse.122

118. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420 (1837).
119. Id. at 546.
120. Id. at 608 (Story, J., dissenting).
121. Opinion of Mr. Taney, Attorney General of the United States, on the Validity of the Law of New
Jersey, Under Which the Camden & Amboy Railroad, and the Delaware and Raritan Companies, Claim a
Monopoly, 45 NILES’ WKLY. REG. 151, 151 (1833); see also EDWIN MERRICK DODD, AMERICAN
BUSINESS CORPORATIONS 125 (1954); CARL BRENT SWISHER, ROGER B. TANEY 363–67 (1935).
Taney was Attorney General from 1831 to 1833.
122. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872). On the underlying
dispute, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics, and Regulated Monopoly: An American
Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263, 1284–92 (1984).
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The contemporary literature largely ignored a significant public health
problem that probably served to justify the price-regulated public utility that
New Orleans created, and instead resorted to the explanation that the
monopoly had been created by bribery and corruption.123
In sum, the classical position on the government and economic
development did not become embedded in American statecraft until the mid19th century. The significance of the change in constitutional doctrine is
clear in the writings of the more distinctly classical law-treatise authors, who
did their most important work in the late 1860s and after. Their target was
not progressive regulatory legislation, which was not yet on the horizon.
Rather, they attacked the “vested rights” doctrine—in particular the Dartmouth
College decision.
The principal Reconstruction and Gilded Age theorists of what came to
be economic substantive due process were Thomas M. Cooley, John F. Dillon,
Christopher Tiedeman, and Francis Wharton.124 Just as these writers were
developing liberty-of-contract doctrine they also worked mightily to dismantle
the public branch of Marshall Era Contract Clause jurisprudence. What is not
always appreciated is that they devoted as many intellectual resources to
undermining Dartmouth College as they did to creating the infrastructure for
constitutional liberty of contract.
Economic substantive due process originated in the state courts and
reflected a strong anti-regulation bias in Jacksonian democracy.125 Thomas M.
Cooley, whose highly influential treatise on Constitutional Limitations began to
develop the doctrine, was Chief Justice of the Michigan Supreme Court from
1864 to 1885. He had begun his career as a Jacksonian democrat but later
became an abolitionist and switched to the Republican Party. The first edition
of Constitutional Limitations was published in 1868, the same year that the
123. See Hovenkamp, supra note 122, at 1303 & n.228 (explaining the public-health and
priceregulation issues); id. at 1296 (explaining the bribery and corruption claims).
124. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 275–93 (Alexis C. Angell
ed., 6th ed. 1890); JOHN F. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 162–73 (2d ed.
1873); CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL OF PERSONS AND
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES § 94 (1900) [hereinafter TIEDEMAN, STATE AND FEDERAL
CONTROL]; CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, A TREATISE ON THE LIMITATIONS OF POLICE POWER IN THE
UNITED STATES: CONSIDERED FROM BOTH A CIVIL AND CRIMINAL STANDPOINT (1886) [herinafter
TIEDEMAN, POLICE POWER]; FRANCIS WHARTON, COMMENTARIES ON LAW, EMBRACING CHAPTERS
ON THE NATURE; THE SOURCE; AND THE HISTORY OF LAW ON INTERNATIONAL LAW; PUBLIC AND
PRIVATE; AND ON CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY LAW §§ 477–502 (1884); see also JOHN NORTON
POMEROY, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 540–620
(1886); Constitutional Law, 94 N. AM. REV. 435–63 (1862). The work of others is summarized in
Hovenkamp, supra note 21, at 397–98.
125. HOVENKAMP, supra note 13, at 171–92; SELLERS, supra note 17, at 50–54; Edward
Corwin, The Doctrine of Due Process of Law Before the Civil War, 24 HARV. L. REV. 366, 460 (1911);
Herbert Hovenkamp, The Cultural Crises of the Fuller Court, 104 YALE L.J. 2309, 2319–20 (1995)
[hereinafter Hovenkamp, Cultural Crises]; Ryan Williams, The One and Only Substantive Due Process
Clause, 120 YALE L.J. 408 (2010).
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Fourteenth Amendment was ratified. Cooley’s stated concern was with
limitations on the power of the states, not the federal government, and also
with state as well as federal constitutional law. Cooley’s discussions often
mixed the two, not making clear whether the principle he was developing
came from the federal or a state constitution.
Cooley and other Gilded Age constitutional law writers were the first to
develop a systematic theory that the federal and state constitutions should be
interpreted so as to limit the influence of special interests. They were not the
first to observe the problem. James Madison, particularly in Federalist No. 10,
had been highly concerned with the problem of “factions” that might hijack
the government for their own ends.126 But Madison’s solutions were purely
structural. He defended constitutional provisions such as those providing for
staggered legislative and presidential terms, indirect election of the President
and Senators, and the other checks and balances dividing authority between
the federal legislative and executive branches, as combatants to capture.127
Richard Epstein observes, and I agree, that these structural limitations in the
Federal Constitution turned out to be “woefully inadequate” for controlling
factions.128 A distinguishing feature of Gilded Age constitutionalism was state
and federal judges’ increasing recognition of the capture problem.
Nevertheless, courts had only limited explicit authority to proceed.
Neither federal nor state constitutions provided a textual hook for judicial
review of legislation simply because that legislation reflected excessive specialinterest influence. Prior to the Fourteenth Amendment, a partial answer lay
in narrowing the one Marshall Era doctrine that seemed most conducive to
capture, namely, the Contract Clause. After the Fourteenth Amendment was
ratified, the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses began to pick up this
role. However, those clauses were intended largely to protect recently freed
slaves from discriminatory state law-making, not as a general brake on
economic regulation.
In the views of Cooley and Wharton, the Contract Clause in particular
had become the vehicle for capture by powerful interest groups. Historically,
Chief Justice Marshall’s extension of the term “contract” to legislatively
granted corporate charters reflected the dominant Framers’ concern with
legislative attempts to renege on previously held rights. To that extent the
Contract Clause operated similarly to the constitutional provisions
prohibiting bills of attainder and ex post facto laws, all retroactivity provisions
that were grouped together in Article I, Section 10.129 At the same time,
however, the history of the contract clause reflects a predominant concern

126. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison, Nov. 22, 1787).
127. Id.
128. EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 22.
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (“No State shall . . . pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto
Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts . . . .”).
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with state attempts to interfere with private debtor–creditor relations, not with
state-created grants used to encourage economic development.130
Nevertheless, Dartmouth College’s application of the Contract Clause to a
corporate charter was not regarded as particularly controversial when it
issued.131
By one historian’s count, some 90% of 19th-century Supreme Court
Contract Clause decisions involved corporate charters.132 In general, the
trend of Marshall Court decisions was to expand the protections given under
corporate charters, while the trend of Taney Court was to diminish them,
beginning with Taney’s conclusion in the Charles River Bridge case that a
monopoly provision would not be recognized unless it was explicit in the
grant.133
Siding with Taney, Cooley added this footnote to the second edition of
his treatise on Constitutional Limitations in 1871:
It is under the protection of the decision in the Dartmouth College
Case that the most enormous and threatening powers in our country
have been created; some of the great and wealthy corporations
actually having greater influence in the country at large and upon
the legislation of the country, than the States to which they owed
their corporate existence. Every privilege granted or right
conferred—no matter by what means or on what pretence—being
made inviolable by the Constitution, the government is frequently
found stripped of its authority in very important particulars, by
unwise, careless or corrupt legislation . . . .134
In addition, Cooley argued, the legislature should be deemed powerless
to contract away its police power.135 Writing as Chief Justice of the Michigan
Supreme Court, Cooley held in the East Saginaw case that a state statute
intended to further investment in salt manufacturing by paying a ten-cent
bounty on each bushel of salt and exempting salt-producing land from
property taxes and could be repealed, even if the statute were construed as a
130. See FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE
CONSTITUTION 274 (1985).
131. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Nineteenth Century Contract Clause: The Role of the
Property-Privilege Distinction and “Takings” Clause Jurisprudence, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 31–33 (1986).
But see Douglas W. Kmiec & John O. McGinnis, The Contract Clause: A Return to the Original
Understanding, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 525, 539–40 (1987).
132. BENJAMIN FLETCHER WRIGHT, JR., THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 243
(1938).
133. Proprietors of the Charles River Bridge v. Proprietors of the Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. (11
Pet.) 420, 487 (1837). Chief Justice Taney relied on a Marshall Era decision holding that a land
grant from the state did not imply a covenant that a subsequent legislature would pass no statutes
affecting the value of use of that land. Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 289 (1830).
134. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST
UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 278 n.2 (2d ed. 1871).
135. Id. at 333–39.
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contract with the complainant.136 The Court was interpreting the Federal
Contract Clause.137 Cooley concluded:
It cannot fail to strike the mind when this claim is put forth, that
the most serious and alarming consequences may flow from it,
should it receive the sanction of the courts. The demand of
exemption is made under that clause of the Constitution of the
United States, which forbids the States to pass any laws violating the
obligation of contracts; and the argument is, that the corporation,
by accepting the offer which the State made to those who should
engage in the development of its resources, in salt, and by actually
obtaining a productive well, has thereby entered into a contract with
the State, by which, in consideration of continued manufacture, the
State for all time so ties up its hands as to preclude the exercise of
the power of taxation in regard to all property which complainant
may employ in the business.138
That theme would frequently resurface in later public-choice literature—
namely, that special-interest legislation should be viewed as a kind of
“contract” with those who obtained it, rather than enactments in the public
interest. Writing in 1853, Taney elaborated on these concerns. Referring to
special privileges in corporate grants he opined that almost every bill of
incorporation:
[I]s drawn originally by the parties who are personally interested in
obtaining the charter; and that they are often passed by the
legislature in the last days of its session, when, from the nature of
our political institutions, the business is unavoidably transacted in a
hurried manner, and it is impossible that every member can
deliberately examine every provision in every bill upon which he is
called on to act.
On the other hand, those who accept the charter have abundant
time to examine and consider its provisions, before they invest their
money.139
Francis Wharton went even further in his 1884 Commentaries, suggesting
that Dartmouth College reflected an obsolete theory of statecraft and should no
longer be regarded as the law:

136. E. Saginaw Mfg. Co. v. City of E. Saginaw, 19 Mich. 259, 269, 287–88 (1869); accord
Opinion of Mr. Taney, Attorney General of the United States, on the Validity of the Law of New Jersey, Under
Which the Camden & Amboy Railroad, and the Delaware and Raritan Companies, Claim a Monopoly,
supra note 121, at 151.
137. E. Saginaw Mfg. Co., 19 Mich. at 262.
138. Id. at 273.
139. Ohio Life Ins. & Tr. Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416, 435–36 (1853).
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The policy of irrevocably granting away public franchises, and
fixing social rights in a constant perpetual mould, has become far
more questionable with the lapse of years than it was at the time the
business of the country was only slowly recovering from the paralysis
produced by the war of 1812 . . . . In those days . . . when an
apparently permanent type had been assumed by society, there was
nothing startling in the position that an adjustment of social rights
made by any particular legislature should bind forever. Now,
however, we have been taught by the great inventions of steam and
of the telegraph, by the marvellous improvements of machinery by
which industries of all kinds have been remodelled, and by the
introduction of new staples displacing old, that the stationary and
apparently immutable condition of society during the first quarter
of the present century was exceptional, and that the normal type of
social life, as of all other kinds of life, is mutability tending to
development.140
Christopher Tiedeman, another architect of economic due process, later
wrote in his 1900 treatise on constitutional rights:
[T]he intention of a legislature to place a private corporation
beyond the reach of the police power of the State—to grant to a
corporation the right to do what it pleases in the exercise of its
corporate powers, it matters not how much injury is inflicted upon
the public, and yet be subject to no control or restraint, which is not
provided by the laws in force when the charter was granted—is so
manifestly unreasonable that we cannot suppose that the legislature
so intended, unless this extraordinary privilege is expressly
granted.141
Subsequent to the Slaughter-House Cases,142 the New Orleans
slaughterhouse monopoly became unpopular. Riding the crest of popular
anger over monopoly, the state adopted a new constitution in 1879,
abolishing most monopoly charters.143 The state then withdrew the
slaughterhouse charter, thus inviting the inevitable Contract Clause
challenge.144 The second Supreme Court decision, this time by Justice Miller,
held that one legislature could not “bargain[] away by contract” a later

140. WHARTON, supra note 124, § 483, at 556.
141. 2 TIEDEMAN, STATE AND FEDERAL CONTROL, supra note 124, § 209, at 952.
142. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872); see also supra text accompanying
notes 122–23.
143. LA. CONST. art. 258 (1879) (“[T]he monopoly features in the charter of any corporation
now existing in the State, save such as may be contained in the charters of railroad companies,
are hereby abolished.”).
144. Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House & Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock
Landing & Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
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legislature’s power to repeal a monopoly grant.145 Both the sixth edition of
Cooley’s Constitutional Limitations (1890)146 and Tiedeman’s Police Power
(1886) enthusiastically agreed. First, Cooley chastised the majority holding in
the first Slaughter-House case because “the grant of a monopoly in one of the
ordinary and necessary occupations of life must be as clearly illegal in this
country as in England; and it would be impossible to defend and sustain it.”147
He then fully embraced the holding in the second Slaughter-House decision,
concluding that “the legislature could not by a grant of this kind make an
irrepealable contract.”148 Tiedeman agreed, concluding that “the State cannot
barter away its police power.”149
An important theme in the Jacksonian reaction to preferences created in
corporate grants was suspicion of special-interest capture. Economic
substantive due process doctrine came to reflect the same concerns. They
emerged full blown during the Lochner era, which often struck down
economic regulations based on a suspicion that the statute in question was
passed at the behest of a favored interest group.150 The classical view,
expressed in a variety of doctrines, was quite simply that legislatures could not
be trusted.
C. THE “PUBLIC PURPOSE” DOCTRINE: FEDERAL AND STATE
Classical statecraft insisted that most human economic interactions be
private, and generally by mutual agreement. The State could intervene only
in furtherance of a narrowly defined “public” purpose or use. At the policy
level, the idea gradually evolved into the notion that government intervention
was appropriate only in the event of a “market failure,” although 19th-century
advocates did not use that term. These views would have strong implications
for the constitutional theory of public finance.
Judicially, doctrine limiting public involvement in the development of
infrastructure or business facilities appeared in a wide variety of contexts,
including the proper scope of the eminent domain power and the taxing
power. The principal constitutional clause that can be construed to create
such a limitation is the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, providing
that: “[N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.”151 While the Federal Takings Clause was not applied against
the states until the 1890s, state constitutions had their own takings clauses.
Further, federal and state law both recognized a “public purpose” doctrine

145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 750.
COOLEY, supra note 124, at 341–42.
Id. at 342.
Id. at 343 n.1.
TIEDEMAN, POLICE POWER, supra note 124, at 582.
HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 266–67.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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that was not explicit in the Constitution outside of the takings context, but
that served to limit the range of government action.
The public purpose doctrine never became as far-reaching or durable
within constitutional doctrine as economic due process doctrine was to
become. Its high point was the 1875 Topeka holding striking down a state
statute that authorized municipalities to levy taxes for the building of railroads
and bridges.152 The bridge in question was incorporated but privately owned.
Justice Miller’s opinion for the Court never cited the United States
Constitution, although he did mention a provision of the 1859 Kansas
Constitution requiring the legislature to authorize municipalities to tax but
also limiting “abuse” of that power.153
Justice Miller’s opinion relied mainly on the treatise on municipal
corporations authored by John H. Dillon, who had also been the reporter for
the decision below,154 as well as Constitutional Limitations. Justice Cooley had
declared:
[T]axation having for its only legitimate object the raising of money
for public purposes and the proper needs of government, the
exaction of moneys from the citizens for other purposes is not a
proper exercise of this power, and must therefore be
unauthorized.155
Cooley himself had cited several decisions in support of his argument for
a public purpose limitation, although they all came from state courts
interpreting their own constitutions. The strongest language was dicta from
an 1865 Wisconsin decision stating that “[t]he legislature cannot create a
public debt, or levy a tax . . . in order to raise funds for a mere private
purpose” where “the public interest or welfare [is] in no way connected with
the transaction.”156 Nevertheless, that court went on to uphold as sufficiently
“public” a tax intended to compensate Civil War draftees for the expense of
buying themselves out of the draft, as federal draft legislation prior to 1865

152. Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 657 (1874) (“The council shall have
power to . . . issu[e] . . . bonds . . . not exceeding ten per cent per annum.” (quoting Kansas Laws,
Ch. LXVIII, Sec. 1 (1872))); see also Cole v. City of La Grange, 113 U.S. 1, 6 (1885) (finding
subsidy for iron company improper taxation for benefit of private person); City of Parkersburg v.
Brown, 106 U.S. 487, 501 (1883) (finding manufacturing subsidy bonds invalid under state law
as taxation for private purpose); Herbert Hovenkamp, The Classical Corporation in American Legal
Thought, 76 GEO. L.J. 1593, 1635–36 (1988).
153. Topeka, 87 U.S. at 657–58 (“Provision shall be made by general law for the organization
of cities, towns and villages; and their power of taxation . . . shall be so restricted as to prevent the
abuse of such power.” (quoting KAN. CONST. art. 12, § 5 (1859))).
154. DILLON, supra note 124; see also Citizens’ Sav. Ass’n v. City of Topeka, 5 F. Cas. 737
(C.C.D. Kan. 1874) (No. 2734).
155. COOLEY, supra note 124, at 598–99.
156. Brodhead v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 624, 652 (Wis. 1865). Cooley also cited Tyson v.
School Directors, 51 Pa. 9 (1865), which struck down a similar provision on the grounds that it was
judicial action disguised as state legislation. COOLEY, supra note 124, at 602 n.3.
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permitted.157 Other decisions that Cooley cited either stood for the opposite
proposition that Cooley was asserting,158 or they were not on point at all.159 In
sum, Cooley largely invented the “public purpose” taxation doctrine, with
little support from case law and none from state or federal constitutional texts.
The noninterpretivist nature of the Topeka decision provoked a dissent
by Justice Nathan Clifford, anticipating many dissents that would be written
during the substantive due process era:
Courts cannot nullify an act of the State legislature on the vague
ground that they think it opposed to a general latent spirit supposed
to pervade or underlie the constitution, where neither the terms nor
the implications of the instrument disclose any such restriction.
Such a power is denied to the courts, because to concede it would
be to make the courts sovereign over both the constitution and the
people, and convert the government into a judicial despotism. . . .
Unwise laws and such as are highly inexpedient and unjust are
frequently passed by legislative bodies, but there is no power vested
in a Circuit Court nor in this court, to determine that any law passed
by a State legislature is void if it is not repugnant to their own
constitution nor the Constitution of the United States.160
In any event, the Topeka doctrine as a constitutional limitation on taxing
power did not have a lengthy run.161 By the late 19th century, prior to Lochner,
it had fallen into disuse in the federal courts, and was rejected even by some
Justices who embraced economic substantive due process doctrine. For
example, in 1896, Lochner author Justice Rufus Peckham upheld a tax scheme
to provide subsidies for the irrigation of privately owned arid farmland.162
Variations of the doctrine retained some traction under state constitutions.
For example, the Court considered many challenges to government issued

157. JOHN REMINGTON GRAHAM, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE MILITARY DRAFT (1971).
158. COOLEY, supra note 124, at 602 (citing Sharpless v. Mayor of Philadelphia, 21 Pa. 147, 168 (Pa.
1853), which upheld a tax assessed for the purpose of purchasing shares in a railroad corporation).
159. Id. at 599 (citing Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa 82 (1859), which upheld a municipal
annexation of adjacent land over protest by farmers that their taxes would increase, and Freeland
v. Hastings, 92 Mass. 570, 575 (1865), which rejected a taxpayer’s challenge to a tax on the
ground that its purpose had not been adequately specified, stating that that every citizen has a
right “to insist that no unlawful or unauthorized exaction shall be made upon him under the
guise of taxation” since municipalities have only the authority granted to them by their state and
a municipality cannot assess a tax that the state had not authorized).
160. Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655, 669 (1874) (Clifford, J., dissenting).
161. See Hovenkamp, supra note 152, at 1638–40 (tracing the subsequent history of Topeka).
Professor Epstein does not discuss this history. See generally EPSTEIN, supra note 3.
162. E.g., Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 178 (1896); see also Green v. Frazier,
253 U.S. 233, 243 (1920) (upholding a tax to subsidize construction of grain mill and elevator).

A1_HOVENKAMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

30

10/16/2015 8:29 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1

municipal bonds for financing private economic development. These were,
for the most part, diversity cases not implicating federal constitutional law.163
D. CONSEQUENTIAL LOSSES FROM ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: THE RISE OF INVERSE
CONDEMNATION
Just as Contract Clause jurisprudence, shifts in eminent domain “takings”
doctrine reflected changing attitudes toward state involvement in economic
development. The classical position is easily stated: First, the market can
generally be trusted to produce socially valuable investments. If a project
requires a government inducement, it is not likely to be worth its costs.
Second, if an investment is, in fact, socially valuable it should be able to bear
all of the costs it imposes on others who might be affected.164 For example,
part of the cost of building a dam or reservoir (whether public or private) is
the injuries imposed on upstream property owners whose land is flooded or
access limited. The best way to insure that investments are efficient is to
require the developer to compensate all those who are injured. That should
guarantee that the value of the investment is at least as great as the losses that
it imposes. Further, in measuring injury the distinction between “trespassory”
injuries involving expropriation of property or invasion over boundary lines,
and “nontrespassory” losses, is really not very important. Both types of injury
can be very real.165 John Lewis, America’s most prominent Gilded Age scholar
of eminent domain, reached these conclusions in the 1880s, referring mainly
to state constitutional law. The Fifth Amendment Takings Clause was not
incorporated against the states until 1897.166
Judicial doctrine under the Federal Takings Clause has never really
followed the classical position very closely, not even during the economic due
process era. Under the U.S. Constitution, government trespasses can be
unlawful takings even if the harm they cause is miniscule.167 By contrast,
nontrespassory land-use restrictions that impose significant economic harms
are often found not to require either the exercise of the eminent domain
power or compensation to injured landowners.168 Gilded Age state

163. See Powe, supra note 65, at 740–41; see also Gelpke v. City of Dubuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.)
175, 206 (1864) (interpreting the Iowa Constitution to prohibit the use of tax-supported bonds
to support private construction).
164. See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) (giving a forceful statement of the classical position).
165. Id.
166. Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 228 (1897).
167. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982)
(finding a taking for the laying of cable TV lines across a roof of a Manhattan apartment building).
168. See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138 (1978) (upholding
a historic landmark designation that limited further development); Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler
Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 396 (1926) (upholding a comprehensive zoning plan without awarding
compensation to a plaintiff for significant loss of value to their property); Welch v. Swasey, 214
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constitutions that included “taking or damaging” provisions, discussed below,
reached much further.169
1. “Public Use”
Nineteenth-century law concerning private-property rights and
government economic development focused largely on two questions. First,
what is the range of injuries to property for which compensation must be
paid? Second, what is the landowner’s right to initiate proceedings against the
government for invasions or injuries that did not result from an express
exercise of the eminent domain power? Because the Fifth Amendment was
not yet applied against the states, and the federal government itself was not
heavily involved in development projects, the cases almost all involved state
constitutions.170
The common law rules for trespassory harms caused by private parties
were well developed. A physical appropriation or actual invasion of land could
be protected by common law actions for ejectment or trespass.
“Nontrespassory” injuries were much more difficult to evaluate. The common
law doctrine of nuisance developed the largely unhelpful principle of sic utere
tuo ut alienum non laedas, or “use your own property so as not to injure that of
another.” The phrase was widely criticized as useless. In his 1859 treatise on
torts, Francis Hilliard concluded that nuisance law covered an “undefined
injury” and resorted to a simple list of activities that courts had condemned as
nuisances.171 Holmes regarded the sic utere principle as no more than “a
benevolent yearning.”172
As the amount and variety of economic development expanded in the
second half of the 19th century, American courts increasingly confronted
government activity that caused significant injury to property even when no
trespass or expropriation occurred. Nevertheless, requiring compensation for
every injury would have been a much more strenuous requirement than the
common law had ever imposed on private parties. The “trespassory”
formulation of traditional eminent domain, which limited legal redress to
actions that actually expropriated property or invaded its boundaries, created
a relatively clear line between compensable and noncompensable harms.
Equally clearly, however, it left many significant injuries uncompensated. One
important element in classical liberalism’s protection for private property was
its insistence that the costs of economic development be internalized, and this
U.S. 91, 108 (1909) (upholding Boston building height restriction, notwithstanding harm to
intending developers).
169. See infra text accompanying notes 195–216.
170. See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 166 U.S. at 226; Santa Clara Co. v. S. Pac. R.R.
Co., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
171. 2 FRANCIS HILLIARD, THE LAW OF TORTS OR PRIVATE WRONGS 66–67 (1859); see also
HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 129–32.
172. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1894).
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necessitated that injuries to others be compensated. Further, the range of
harms was not limited by physical property boundaries.
During the Early National Period, the principle of just compensation was
not consistently established in American law, not even under Revolutionary
Era state constitutions. Reflecting pre-classical values, the first state
constitutions tended to emphasize the use of government power to facilitate
development and were much less concerned with compensation for injured
owners. Some states authorized the taking without compensation of
undeveloped land for the creation of roads or streets,173 while others required
it.174 Many courts indulged a presumption, whether or not historically
justified, that grants of land from the sovereign implicitly included a sixpercent excess that could later be taken back without compensation for road
construction.175 The courts divided on the question of “offsets” from
enhanced value. Several state statutes provided that when the coming of a
railroad, canal, or other public improvement enhanced the market value of
the comdemnee’s property, the enhancement could be used as an offset
against the damages award. This sometimes left the land owner with
nothing.176 As developed below, in the 1830s and after courts came to
embrace more classical ideas about the role of the state in economic
development. The result was both stricter compensation requirements and a
narrowed view of “public use.”177
173. E.g., Territory v. Hattick, 2 Mart. (o.s.) 87 (Orleans 1811); M’Clenachan v. Curwen, 6
Binn. 509 (Pa. 1802) (holding that the compensation for a road was limited to the value of its
improvements); Feree v. Meily, 3 Yeates 153 (Pa. 1801) (same). As late as 1851, the Georgia
Supreme Court held that no compensation was required for a road built over the land owner’s
unenclosed land. Parham v. Justices of the Inferior Court, 9 Ga. 341 (1851).
174. E.g., Perry v. Wilson, 7 Mass. 393 (1811) (requiring compensation); Commonwealth v.
Blue-Hill Tpk. Corp., 5 Mass. 420 (1809) (same); Commonwealth v. Coombs, 2 Mass. 489 (1807)
(requiring compensation but permitting offset for enhanced value); Commonwealth v. Peters, 2
Mass. 125 (1806) (same); In re New Mkt St., 4 Yeates 133 (Pa. 1804); Lindsay v. Comm’rs, 2 S.C.L.
38 (Ct. App. 1796) (divided court) (same); Attorney-Gen. v. Turpin, 13 Va. 548 (1809) (same).
175. M’Clenachan, 6 Binn. at 512–13 (remanding to consider whether each grant of land
contained a six-percent overage subject to later condemnation for roads without compensation,
as developer alleged); Feree, 3 Yeates at 155 (“[E]very grant of lands made an allowance of six
acres in each hundred for roads and highways.”); cf. Lindsay, 2 S.C.L. at 49–50 (equally divided
court) (stating that the right to take back a portion of property for public streets and roads is
inherent in sovereignty).
176. Alton & Sangamon R.R. Co. v. Carpenter, 14 Ill. 190 (1852) (permitting offset);
McIntire v. State, 5 Blackf. 384 (Ind. 1840) (permitting offset); Commonwealth v. Justices of the
Sessions, 9 Mass. 388 (1812) (sustaining a jury verdict of no damages because challenger’s
property was benefitted by a road erected through it at least as much as the harm it caused);
Symonds v. Cincinnati, 14 Ohio 147 (1846) (permitting offset); JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS
AND AMERICAN LAW 190–93 (2001) (collecting other cases). But see Jacob v. City of Louisville, 39
Ky. 114 (1839) (denying offset); Woodfolk v. Nashville & Chattanooga R.R. Co., 32 Tenn. 422
(1852) (same).
177. Shepardson v. Milwaukee & Beloit R.R. Co., 6 Wis. 605 (1857) (stating that eminent
domain power must be asserted and compensation paid upon initial assertion and not after
construction of a railroad line is completed); accord Carson v. Coleman, 11 N.J. Eq. 106 (1856);
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An 1802 Pennsylvania decision denied a landowner compensation from
a private chartered turnpike company, which had been authorized to build a
toll road from Philadelphia to Lancaster and given eminent domain power.178
The landowner argued that the Pennsylvania Constitution’s Takings Clause
required compensation to be paid, but the court cited the six-percent excess
rule and limited compensation to the value of improvements.179 It also
rejected the landowner’s objection that the turnpike company was unjustly
enriched because it was able to charge tolls for those using the road but was
not required to compensate landowners for their loss. A Louisiana decision
from 1816, four years after it became a state, held that the Fifth Amendment
of the United States Constitution did not apply to Louisiana and that no state
law required compensation when the government widened a canal, taking
some of the plaintiff’s property.180 Other courts interpreted their state
constitutions to require that assertions of eminent domain be subject to the
“law of the land.” Initially some courts held that the mere existence of a statute
authorizing the taking satisfied this requirement, even without provision for
compensation.181 In the 1830s, however, courts increasingly began holding
that “law of the land” implied a compensation requirement.182
As in the Pennsylvania turnpike case, most state courts held throughout
the period that a taking could be for a “public” use even though the
condemnor was privately owned. A significant debate developed, however,
over the range of uses that could meet a “public use” requirement. Turnpikes,
canals, and later railroads were typically common carriers, open to everyone,
and their development was regarded as a quasi-state function, satisfying any

Goodall v. City of Milwaukee, 5 Wis. 32, 54 (1856) (“Compensation must precede entry and
permanent occupation, or a safe and adequate fund be provided.”). Some courts also recognized
and enforced legislative provisions to the effect that if railroad construction enhanced the value
of the land owner’s remaining land this enhanced value should be an offset against the
compensation award.
178. M’Clenachan, 6 Binn. at 509, 513.
179. Id. at 511–12 (“The validity of the act is impeached by its being repugnant to the
constitution of Pennsylvania, which directs that no man’s property shall be taken for public use,
without his own consent or that of his legal representatives, nor without compensation.”).
180. Renthorp v. Bourg, 4 Mart. (o.s.) 97, 130–38 (La. 1816); see also Lindsay, 2 S.C.L. 38. A
few courts disagreed, at least for outright expropriation. See Gardner v. Trs. of Newburgh, 2 Johns
Ch. 162 (N.Y. Ch. 1816) (requiring compensation for diversion of stream that had run through
the plaintiff’s land for a long time).
181. Patrick v. Comm’rs of Cross Roads, 15 S.C.L. (4 McCord) 541 (1828) (holding that a statute
permitting road takings without compensation satisfied the “law of the land” requirement).
182. See Young v. McKenzie, 3 Ga. 31, 44 (1847) (requiring compensation under the state
constitution “law of the land” requirement); see also Ex Parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198 (1853)
(requiring compensation under the “law of the land” requirement in the state constitution’s
preamble); Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co. v. Davis, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 451, 460 (1837) (holding
that a provision in the North Carolina Constitution requiring that one could not be deprived of
property except by “the law of the land” implied a just compensation requirement).

A1_HOVENKAMP.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

34

10/16/2015 8:29 AM

IOWA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 101:1

public use requirement.183 By contrast, taking for purely private roads were
viewed much more harshly.184
The mill-dam acts, which originated in the colonies in the early 18th
century and continued to be enacted during the early national period, went
further. They extended a quasi-eminent domain power to takers who were not
common carriers or transportation utilities. Under them, a land owner could
build a dam for water power that flooded upstream land, provided that
compensation was paid to the injured property owners.185 Further, those
building the mills did not ordinarily have their prices regulated, nor did they
operate under the universal service obligations imposed on common carriers.
For example, the Commonwealth of Massachusetts applied its statute in favor
of textile mills for purely private manufacturing in order to promote “labour
saving machines.”186
By the 1830s, the mill-dam acts occasioned a significant debate between
Federalist and Whig interests, who favored their expansive use, and
Jacksonians, who opposed them. The core of the dispute concerned whether
the mill-dam floodings were for a public use. Traditional “grist” mills, or
cereal mills, were used for the grinding of food grains. These mills had
traditionally been regarded as enterprises “affected with a public interest,”
required to serve all customers, and could be destroyed only upon payment

183. See, e.g., Whiteman v. Wilmington & Susquehanna R.R. Co., 2 Del. (2 Harr.) 514 (1839);
Tide Water Canal Co. v. Archer, 9 G. & J. 479 (Md. 1839); Raleigh & Gaston R.R. Co., 19 N.C.
451; Bloodgood v. Mohawk & Hudson R.R. Co., 18 Wend. 9 (N.Y. Cor. Er. 1837); Beekman v.
Saratoga & Schenectady R.R. Co., 3 Paige Ch. 45 (N.Y. Ch. 1831); see also Brown v. Beatty, 34
Miss. 227 (1857) (finding evidence of injury caused by the railroad’s trespasses outside of the
right of way and remanding for trial on those damages); cf. Woods v. Nashua Mfg. Co., 5 N.H.
467 (1831) (finding the owner of land subjected to a canal right of way entitled to compensation
but that the canal company was entitled to pay as a lump sum rather than stretched out to reflect
possibly subsequent injuries); Tuckahoe Canal Co. v. Tuckahoe & James River R.R. Co., 38 Va.
42 (1840) (following the federal rule in the Charles River Bridge case that a monopoly provision
in a grant to a canal would not be implied, but must be explicit, but then holding that when a
subsequent railroad right of way interfered with the canal, the latter was entitled to judicially
measured compensation).
184. Roberts v. Williams, 15 Ark. 43 (1854) (finding a taking for a purely private road
unlawful); Brewer v. Bowman, 9 Ga. 37 (1850) (similar); Dickey v. Tennison, 27 Mo. 373 (1858)
(holding that condemnation for a purely private road did not satisfy state constitution’s “public
use” requirement); Taylor v. Porter & Ford, 4 Hill 140 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843) (similar); In re Albany
St., 11 Wend. 149 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1834) (taking of more land than required for a street did not
meet state constitution’s authorization of condemnation for a public use); Clack v. White, 32
Tenn. 540 (1852) (striking down a legislative attempt to broaden the common law doctrine of
easement by necessity so as to enable one person to obtain a road over neighboring land upon a
showing of convenience). But see In re Hickman, 4 Del. 580 (1847) (upholding a statute
authorizing the taking for a private road after noting that it also required compensation).
185. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Ellis, 11 Mass. 462, 462 (Mass. 1814); Stowell v. Flagg, 11
Mass. 364, 364 (Mass. 1814); Town of Lebanon v. Olcott, 1 N.H. 339, 342 (N.H. 1818). See
generally Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource Allocation by Government: The
United States, 1789–1910, 3 J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973).
186. See HANDLIN & HANDLIN, supra note 57, at 127 (quoting Acting Governor Lincoln).
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of compensation.187 Further, their prices could be regulated.188 By contrast,
saw mills, paper mills, and textile manufacturers, which also ran on water
power, were ordinary businesses that operated under common law rules
entitling them to deal or not at their volition.189 In the 1830s, courts began to
hold that state statutes authorizing the flooding of land for creating a grist
mill for food could not be applied to the creation of a saw mill or paper mill,
because the latter were not of a public character.190 An 1858 Alabama decision
struck down for lack of public use a mill-dam statute purporting to cover all
types of mills.191 In 1860, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin considered a milldam act that had been previously enacted and upheld by the state supreme
court, repealed, and then reenacted. The court acknowledged that if it had
to decide the issue, anew it would rule the statute unconstitutional. However,
there had been so much investment in reliance on the provision, as well as
the judicial decision upholding it, that it was unwilling to cause such a costly
dislocation.192
Post-Civil War decisions commonly struck the statutes down. In Ryerson v.
Brown, Justice Cooley wrote the opinion striking down a Michigan statute that
authorized the developers of dams to flood upstream property.193 The statute
was not limited to grist mills, which Cooley acknowledged might be
considered matters of “necessity.”194 After summarizing cases from many
states, he concluded that unsubsidized private competition should yield
sufficient dams:

187. HENRY W. FARNAM, CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF SOCIAL LEGISLATION IN THE UNITED
STATES TO 1860, at 95 (Clive Day ed., Lawbook Exch. 2d prtg. 2006) (1938); see, e.g., Sadler v.
Langham, 34 Ala. 311, 336 (1859) (relying on state statute declaring grist mills to be “public
mills”); State v. Edwards, 29 A. 947, 949 (Me. 1893) (holding that a mill is a “public mill, and
rightfully within legislative control”); Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 245 (1828)
(holding that a statute requiring erection of costly locks on a grist mill required compensation);
see also State v. Glen, 52 N.C. 321 (1859) (requiring compensation when a dam apparently used
to drive both a grist mill and a saw mill was forced to make costly alterations in order to permit
fish to pass over it).
188. FARNAM, supra note 187, at 94–98.
189. Some sawmills may also have been classified as public utilities during and prior to the
Revolution. See JOHN LEWIS, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN IN THE UNITED STATES
§ 165, § 179 (1888).
190. Harding v. Goodlett, 11 Tenn. (3 Yer.) 41, 53 (1832).
191. Sadler, 34 Ala. at 333–35; cf. Traver v. Merrick Cty., 15 N.W. 690, 693 (Neb. 1883).
192. Fisher v. Horicon Iron & Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351, 352–54 (1860). More of the legislative
wrangling is recounted in Stephens v. Marshall, 3 Pin. 203 (Wis. 1851); and Newcomb v Smith, 2 Pin.
131 (Wis. 1849). The Wisconsin Supreme Court had held six years earlier that upstream flooding
by the construction of a mill required compensation. Thien v. Voegtlander, 3 Wis. 461 (1854);
see also Jordan v. Woodward, 40 Me. 317, 324 (1855) (upholding mill dam act only because of
“long acquiescence of our citizens in its provisions,” making it “the settled law of the State”).
193. Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333 (1877).
194. Id. at 338.
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In this state it is doubtful if such legislation would add at all to the
aggregate of property. Numerous fine mill-sites in the populous
counties of the state still remain unimproved, not because of any
difficulty in obtaining the necessary permission to flow, but because
the power is not in demand. If the power were needed, the land
would generally be obtained on reasonable terms, except, perhaps,
where there was ground to believe a dam would become a nuisance;
and in such cases no permission to take lands, and no condemnation
for mill purposes, could protect the parties maintaining a dam
against prosecution for the public grievance.195
Cooley’s discussion introduced what became a recurring theme in the
debate over the appropriate scope of the eminent domain power. The
classical position was that eminent domain should be used only in the event
of a market failure that entitles the sovereign to force a transaction that would
not ordinarily be made. The most common failure is “holdout” problems that
occur when a landowner can insist on an above-market price simply because
there are no good alternatives to the condemner’s use of his property. But if
the market is competitive, as Cooley pointed out, and offers ample
alternatives, then the power is unnecessary and its exercise cannot be for a
public use.
Cooley also suggested that the traditional rule that grist mills are public
utilities should be re-examined in light of the railroad, which permitted grains
to be transported for long distances, and also of steam engines, which were
powering a growing percentage of mills but did not require a dam.196 In any
event, using eminent domain to justify flooding in order to create mills
required
the use to be public in fact; in other words, that it should contain
provisions entitling the public to accommodations. A flouring mill
in this state may grind exclusively the wheat of Wisconsin, and sell
the product exclusively in Europe; and it is manifest that in such a
case the proprietor can have no valid claim to the interposition of
the law to compel his neighbor to sell a business site to him . . . .197
Writing in the late 1880s, John Lewis concluded in his treatise on
eminent domain that the term “public use” meant that takings by private
parties were permissible only if the taker intended to use them for a public
utility or similar firm with a universal service obligation. For example, while a
taking for a toll road open to everyone might be permitted, a taking for a
private road from which the taker “may lawfully exclude the public . . . is

195.
196.
197.

Id. at 337–38.
Id. at 338–40.
Id. at 338.
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void.”198 Lewis quoted at length from an 1868 Iowa Supreme Court decision
written by Justice John F. Dillon.199 The decision held that the exercise of
eminent domain power for the creation of a purely private road was void
under that state’s constitution.200
2. Inverse Condemnation
“Inverse” condemnation refers to challenges when the government does
not acknowledge a taking but nevertheless does something the landowner
claims to be a taking in fact. The Fifth Amendment Eminent Domain Clause
and, historically, the equivalent clauses in state constitutions provided
compensation only for a “taking,” which was historically interpreted to refer
to outright expropriation. By contrast, the law of trespass required an
unauthorized intrusion that actually crossed the owner’s boundary line, such
as an easement or flooding. For example, Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., a diversity
case in which the Supreme Court applied the Wisconsin Constitution, found
a taking when a state statute authorized a corporation to build a dam that
flooded the plaintiff’s property without clearly providing for compensation.201
The government had never asserted the eminent domain power in
Pumpelly, however. An increasing number of courts by this time were allowing
common-law trespass damages for the “consequential” harms of government
development activity.202 Pumpelly’s action had been brought in “trespass on
the case,” which was a common law form used for “indirect” injuries that
might or might not involve a physical trespass. Through the novel
combination of a tort writ and a state takings clause, plaintiffs were able to
avoid the sovereign-immunity defense.203 Even so, the court had to distinguish
several decisions that had found no liability for governmental actors under

198. LEWIS, supra note 189, § 167, at 229.
199. See id. § 167, at 230–31 (quoting Bankhead v. Brown, 25 Iowa 540, 547–48 (1868)).
200. Bankhead, 25 Iowa 540; accord Sadler v. Langham, 34 Ala. 311 (1859); Nesbitt v.
Trumbo, 39 Ill. 110 (1866).
201. Pumpelly v. Green Bay Co., 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 166 (1871). On Pumpelly, see EPSTEIN,
supra note 164, at 38–44.
202. E.g. Hooker v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 14 Conn. 146 (1841) (recognizing
action in trespass for periodic flooding brought about by canal reconstruction); Sinnickson v.
Johnson, 17 N.J.L. 129 (1839) (granting damages for consequential damages caused by
government-authorized construction of canal in action for trespass on the case); Pratt v. Brown,
3 Wis. 603 (1854) (regarding trespass on the case and the Mill-Dam Act, requiring compensation
for excessive flooding).
203. See, e.g., Tinsman v. Belvidere Del. R.R. Co., 26 N.J.L. 148 (1857) (discussing trespass
on the case for injuries from railroad construction and distinguishing between harms caused by
a private railroad corporation, which did not have sovereign immunity, and the government
itself); see also McCarthy v. City of Minneapolis, 281 N.W. 759 (1938) (recounting history
indicating that Minnesota “taking or damaging” provision did not create a new cause of action
but rather served to remove the sovereign immunity defense).
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similar facts.204 The Supreme Court concluded that, to the extent the statute
did not require compensation, it violated the 1848 Wisconsin Constitution,
whose takings language roughly tracked that of the federal Fifth
Amendment.205
After the Civil War, claims against the government soared, reflecting
much more classical concerns about the private costs of governmentsupported economic development. Pumpelly had involved flooding of the
plaintiff’s land, which would have been an unlawful trespass in any event.
About the same time as Pumpelly, several states replaced their constitutions or
enacted amendments requiring compensation if property was either taken or
“damaged.” Illinois went first, including a “damaging” provision in its new
constitution of 1870.206 It was responding to landowner complaints of
eminent domain power run amok, particularly as exercised by railroads.
Eminent domain treatise writer John Lewis observed in 1888 that every state
that revised its constitution after 1870, except North Carolina, included such
a provision.207 By 1880, 11 states had made this change, and by 1912, half of
the states had done so. All but one of the states readmitted to the union after
1870 included a “taking or damaging” constitutional provision.208 The
Federal Constitution was never amended.
Since there was so little history requiring assertion of the eminent
domain power for mere market damage, the new provisions greatly increased
the number of “inverse” claims, generally brought as common law actions in
trespass or trespass on the case.209 The Illinois Supreme Court recognized
such a claim in 1873, shortly after its state constitution was amended, when a
municipal railroad’s excavations limited access to the plaintiff’s lot.210 The

204. E.g., Hanson v. City Council, 18 La. 295 (1841) (denying action involving destruction
of private buildings for road construction); Canal Appraisers of New York v. People ex rel. Tibbits,
17 Wend. 571 (N.Y. 1836) (granting no compensation where river improvements made the
plaintiff’s mill worthless); Alexander v. City of Milwaukee, 16 Wis. 247 (1862) (denying action
where the city’s excavation caused intermittent flooding).
205. Pumpelly, 80 U.S. at 166 (“The property of no person shall be taken for public use
without just compensation therefor.” (quoting WIS. CONST. art. I, § 13 (1848))).
206. See ILL. CONST. of 1870, art. II, § 13 (“Private property shall not be taken or damaged
for public use without just compensation.”).
207. LEWIS, supra note 189, § 222, at 296.
208. See Robert Brauneis, The First Constitutional Tort: The Remedial Revolution in NineteenthCentury State Just Compensation Law, 52 VAND. L. REV. 57, 119–25 (1999). The states that included
this provision were “Colorado (1876), Montana (1889), North Dakota (1889), South Dakota
(1889), Washington (1889), Wyoming (1890), Utah (1896), Oklahoma (1907), Arizona (1912),
New Mexico (1912), Alaska (1959), and Hawaii (1959).” Id. at 120 n.272. The only state not to
include such a provision was Idaho, admitted in 1890. See id.
209. See LEWIS, supra note 189, §§ 222–31, at 296–312.
210. City of Pekin v. Brereton, 67 Ill. 477 (1873) (involving excavation adjacent to plaintiff’s
land that obstructed sidewalks and roads). Prior to the Civil War and before the “damaging”
provisions, courts consistently denied claims for nontrespassory and purely consequential
damages. See, e.g., New Albany & Salem R.R. Co. v. O’Daily, 12 Ind. 551 (1859); Chapman v.
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court observed that prior to 1870, when the Illinois Constitution was
amended to include the “damaging” provision, such actions were regularly
disallowed.211 An 1881 Illinois Supreme Court decision found an
unconstitutional “damaging” when the city of Chicago built a viaduct that
limited a property owner’s access to heavily travelled Halsted Street.212 No
portion of the plaintiff’s land bordered on Halsted Street and the
construction did not encroach on his boundary lines, so there was no
trespass.213 His claim was simply that his property was less valuable because the
construction raised the street and occupants of his rental property could now
access it only by climbing steps.214 Because the city had never asserted its
eminent domain authority against him, the land owner brought a common
law action for trespass on the case for an “indirect” harm.215 The trial court
had rejected the land owner’s proposed jury instruction that permitted
liability if the “plaintiff’s said premises were permanently damaged and
depreciated in value by reason of being deprived of such access.”216 Rather,
the court gave a traditional instruction that permitted liability only for actual
expropriation or physical trespass.217 The Illinois Supreme Court reversed,
noting that Illinois’ previous 1848 Constitution had applied “only to cases of
an actual appropriation of private property by the State,” but the “damaging”
provision had been intended to go further.218 At the same time, however, the
court observed that many things a municipality does, such as relocating a jail,
might have an adverse effect on nearby property values.219 While it could not
permit damages in all such cases, the present one involved a limitation on
access.220
As John Lewis assessed the new constitutional provisions, the right to
damages under them could not “be reduced to a question of distance, but
depend[ed] upon the fact of the market value of the premises being actually
depreciated by reason of the obstruction or improvement.”221 Lewis
acknowledged that such claims could run to very large amounts. Nevertheless,
speaking of the aggregate injuries of affected land owners: “[W]hy is not that
part of the cost of the improvement; and, if taken into account as such, why
Albany & Schenectady R.R. Co., 10 Barb. 360 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1851); Drake v. Hudson River
R.R. Co., 7 Barb. 508 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1849).
211. See id. at 480–81 (citing Murphy v. City of Chicago, 29 Ill. 279 (1861); Moses v.
Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chi. R.R. Co., 21 Ill. 516 (1859)).
212. Rigney v. City of Chicago, 102 Ill. 64 (1881).
213. Id. at 69, 76.
214. Id. at 69–70.
215. Id. at 70–71.
216. Id. at 69.
217. Id. at 69–70.
218. Id. at 71.
219. Id. at 80–81.
220. Id. at 80.
221. LEWIS, supra note 189, § 227, at 308.
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should not the loser of it receive it?”222 That was about the purest statement
of classical liberal economics ever given by a 19th-century property lawyer.
Even during the height of economic substantive due process, the
Supreme Court never applied takings law with the same aggressiveness as it
did liberty-of-contract doctrine. This was true even though the Federal
Takings Clause was far more explicit than anything the Court relied on to
support liberty of contract generally. Most particularly, in Euclid v. Ambler
Realty, Justice Sutherland wrote the Court’s 5–4 decision upholding a
comprehensive zoning provision, notwithstanding evidence that the negative
impact on the plaintiff’s property values was severe.223 The courts required a
far lesser showing in order to sustain substantive due process challenges to
protective labor wage and hour statutes, occupational licensing provisions, or
even some health regulations.224 Three years earlier, Sutherland himself had
written the majority opinion striking down a minimum wage statute applied
to women workers in Washington, D.C.225
IV. THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
Both proponents and critics of the classical Constitution have considered
that it somehow embodies a social contract or “compact,” based on a
presumption of unanimous consent at some a priori point.226 Citizens consent
to be governed by legislation that is almost always non-unanimous. As a result,
this legislation must be tested against social-contract principles, considering
what those forming the social contract would have wanted, and what they were
willing to give up in order to have it.
Both sides have significantly exaggerated the role of the social contract
in American constitutional thought. Historically, when courts used the term,
they were either referring to a specific text, such as a federal or state
constitution, or else the statement was made as dicta, but nothing more. Even
during the liberty-of-contract era, judges rarely used the idea of the social
contract, even as background, for constitutional interpretation.
The idea of fundamental law based on an implied social contract has
captured people of very different ideologies, from Richard Epstein, or

222. Id. at 309.
223. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 384 (1926) (noting plaintiff’s claim
that land had been worth $10,000 per acre prior to the zoning ordinance’s enactment but was
subsequently worth only $2500 per acre); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 130–31.
224. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 243–48, 263–66.
225. See generally Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
226. See, e.g., EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 20; see also VIII FISS, supra note 21, at 49, 82; ROBERT
NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 131–32, 183–89 (1974); RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 142–50 (1981); Edward S. Corwin, The Basic Doctrine of American
Constitutional Law, 12 MICH. L. REV. 247, 250–54 (1914). For a good overview, see generally RON
REPLOGLE, RECOVERING THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (1989). See also John Harrison, Substantive Due
Process and the Constitutional Text, 83 VA. L. REV. 493, 530 (1997).
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Buchanan and Tullock on one side, to John Rawls on the other.227 Therein
lies one of its biggest problems. As a principle of social ordering it is
frustratingly indeterminate because of its sensitivity to assumptions about who
the imagined original parties to this contract were and what they valued. Did
each person set out to protect only her own interest, or were they outwardly
regarding for the welfare of others?228 Did their theory of value depend on
past investment or on rational expectations about the future? Relatedly, did
they know about their future stations in life, or were they acting behind a “veil
of ignorance?”229 Only the assumption of at least a limited veil of ignorance is
consistent with a marginalist theory of rational expectations. An assumption
of full knowledge about future status eliminates risk from the calculus and as
a result has no relevance to the world we actually live in.
Whoever the parties to the classical social contract were, they could not
possibly have been marginalists. Marginalist theories of value, which are
characteristic of economics since the late 19th century, are driven by
expectations concerning the future. As a result, risk always enters the calculus.
Even a completely self-interested marginalist would maximize expected
individual value by maximizing aggregate value. For example, if economic
development of a certain type promised increased social value while reducing
the value of some individual property rights, the self-interested marginalist
would favor development. On average, she would come out a winner. A
marginalist would maximize the individual value of property rights by
considering expected utility and risk. She would participate in economic
development, or even social insurance schemes, if the expected value was
greater than costs. Indeed, depending on the participant’s degree of risk
aversion, she might participate in programs whose aggregate costs were
greater than benefits when not adjusted for risk. For example, even if the
provision of universal health insurance produced a deadweight loss of ten
percent from administrative costs, she would participate if she were adverse
to the risk of catastrophic loss that might be caused by a large, uninsured
medical event. She would also agree to government intervention to correct
market failures if she believed that the incremental value produced by the
correction exceeded its incremental cost. As a result she would agree to cost–
benefit analysis of regulatory provisions. Consistent with that, she would agree
to at least certain forms of land-use regulation, safety regulation, or regulation

227. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 1; EPSTEIN, supra note 3; JOHN RAWLS, A
THEORY OF JUSTICE 19 (1971); see also BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE
10 (1980).
228. As an example of the latter, JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 26–28
(Charles Frankel ed., 1947) (1762); cf. RAWLS, supra note 227, at 75 (assuming self interest).
229. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 1, at 4 (assuming full information about
future status); VIII FISS, supra note 21, at 82 (noting that the social-contract theory of the Lochner
Era assumed that people knew about their individual wealth and status prior to formation). Contra
RAWLS, supra note 227, at 36–37 (assuming a “veil of ignorance”).
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of pure foods and drugs or financial institutions. Further, even if the original
contracting parties knew about their initial position, they would act to
minimize risk for the uncertain future, and those with more to lose might be
more risk averse.230
The original contracting parties would also have to consider tradeoffs
between shorter-run investments and longer-run payoffs, and that leads to
another important assumption. Would the participants in the social contract
want to maximize everything for their own immediate generation, not caring
about what was left for the next and subsequent generations, or would they
prefer to maximize value over the longer run, delaying short-run value for the
sake of descendants? The most significant implication of marginalist thinking
is that values are based on expectations about the future, and “expectations”
can refer to shorter or longer time horizons. As a result the “social contract”
shatters into different and conflicting ideas about the State, depending on
what people value, their degree of risk aversion or concern about the
future.231 Depending on assumptions, social-contract theory can get you
either the libertarian state or the socialist state.
In any event, the social contract also fares poorly in the historical
literature of United States constitutionalism. A few writers have seen the
development of classical constitutional theory in the 19th century as
reflecting a strong conception of a social contract.232 Support is minimal,
however. The Framers of the Constitution clearly grasped the idea of a social
contract, or compact, although their thought was influenced at least as much
by heavily contractual Christian doctrine, with its theology of the covenant.233
Further, with few exceptions, the Founders thought of the social contract as a
set of authoritative texts or “compacts” to which the members of society had
given some kind of consent.234 That is, the term “social compact” almost always

230. See, e.g., Daniel Paravisini et al., Risk Aversion and Wealth: Evidence from Person-to-Person
Lending Portfolios 5 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16063, 2010), http://
www.nber.org/papers/w16063.pdf.
231. HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 25–35.
232. On the earlier period, see generally EPSTEIN, supra note 3. On the Gilded Age and
Progressive Era, see generally VIII FISS, supra note 21.
233. See, e.g., BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
58–60 (1967); JOHN F. FENTON, THE THEORY OF THE SOCIAL COMPACT AND ITS INFLUENCE UPON
THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1891); JOHN C. MILLER, ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION
170–76 (1943); GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at
282–90 (1969); Andrew C. McLaughlin, Social Compact and Constitutional Construction, 5 AM. HIST.
REV. 467, 469 (1900); Thad W. Tate, The Social Contract in America, 1774–1787: Revolutionary
Theory as a Conservative Instrument, 22 WM. & MARY Q. 375, 376 (1965). On the qualifier that
republican virtues and Christianity counted as well, see STEVEN M. DWORETZ, THE UNVARNISHED
DOCTRINE: LOCKE, LIBERALISM, AND THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 5–7 (1990); GARRY WILLS,
INVENTING AMERICA: JEFFERSON’S DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 230–40 (1978); Hovenkamp,
supra note 122, at 2316–17; James T. Kloppenberg, The Virtues of Liberalism: Christianity,
Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74 J. AM. HIST. 9, 9–33 (1987).
234. See infra text accompanying notes 245–53.
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referred to an actual enacted or ratified text. There is no evidence that any
significant group of participants in the making of the Constitution intended
for judges to be able to reach beyond the text to a background social-contract
principle of constitutional decision making.
By contrast, the social contract in the Lockean theory of classical
statecraft is not a single document or written compact, or even an historical
event in time. Rather, it is a hypothesized a priori bargaining position from
which government emerges. Blackstone, whose Commentaries slightly preceded
the Constitution’s formation and quickly became the most important legal
treatise in the United States, clearly understood the concept of an original
social contract. He also understood that it was a conceptual reconstruction
rather than an historical event or document.235 In Book I of the Commentaries,
Blackstone speculated that there might have been some historical
“unconnected state of nature” from which people merged “together in a large
plain” and “entered into an original contract” to chose “the tallest man
present to be their governor.”236
Blackstone almost immediately concluded, however, that “[t]his notion,
of an actually existing unconnected state of nature, is too wild to be seriously
admitted.” Further, “it is plainly contradictory to the revealed accounts of the
primitive origins of mankind,” which he described as gradually evolving from
families to clans. Nevertheless, he concluded, although there was no such
historical compact in fact, the conception of it for the purpose of mutual
protection is valuable:
And this is what we mean by the original contract of society; which,
though perhaps in no instance it has ever been formally expressed
at the first institution of a state, yet in nature and reason must always
be understood and implied, in the very act of associating together:
namely, that the whole should protect all its parts, and that every
part should pay obedience to the will of the whole; or, on other
words, that the community should guard the rights of each
individual member, and that (in return for this protection) each
individual should submit to the laws of the community . . . .237
The social contract from Locke through Blackstone was distinctively “preclassical.” Indeed, one important characteristic of the British classical political
economists is the extent to which they either rejected or ignored social-

235. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *121–46.
236. Id. at *47. Quotations are from the first full edition of Blackstone published in the
United States, edited by St. George Tucker, a professor at the College of William and Mary and a
Virginia judge. BLACKSTONES’S COMMENTARIES: WITH NOTES OF REFERENCE, TO THE
CONSTITUTION AND LAWS, OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES; AND OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA (St. George Tucker ed., 1803).
237. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 8, at *47.
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contract theory.238 Adam Smith, whose Wealth of Nations (1776) came to
represent the economic ideology of the classical Constitution in the mid-19th
century, dismissed the social contract and the idea of an early state of nature
as meaningless fiction. For him, political development was largely a product
of gradually evolving norms. The “invisible hand” that enabled the economy
and the State to function was hardly the product of a historical social compact,
and Smith’s Lectures on Justice (1763) rejected it as the raison d’être of civil
government. Neither The Wealth of Nations (1776) nor The Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759) ever mentions the subject.239 Smith’s British followers,
including Malthus, Ricardo, and Mill, all defended economic
nonintervention strongly, but uniformly ignored or dismissed the idea of a
social contract as the basis for their beliefs.240 John Stuart Mill’s Political
Economy included a lengthy argument for laissez faire economic principles, but
the social contract never appeared among his defenses.241 He rejected the
idea in his essays on utilitarianism and liberty.242 The 19th-century American
political economists very largely did the same thing—defending laissez faire
economic doctrine vigorously, but giving little thought to a social contract as
the justification.243 This was true even of Jacksonian political economists such
as Henry Vethake.244

238. Hovenkamp, Cultural Crises, supra note 125, at 2316–17. For example, Thomas Sowell’s
masterful study completely ignores the subject. See generally THOMAS SOWELL, ON CLASSICAL
ECONOMICS (2006).
239. ADAM SMITH, LECTURES ON JUSTICE, POLICE, REVENUE AND ARMS 11–15 (Edwin Cannan
ed., 1896) (1763). See generally SMITH, supra note 9; ADAM SMITH, THE THEORY OF MORAL
SENTIMENTS (6th ed. 1790).
240. See generally THOMAS ROBERT MALTHUS, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (W.
Pickering ed., 2d ed. 1836) (1820); DAVID RICARDO, 1 ON THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY AND TAXATION, reprinted in 1 THE WORKS AND CORRESPONDENCE OF DAVID RICARDO 1
(Piero Sraffa ed., 1951) (1817).
241. JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 941–79 (W.J. Ashley ed.,
Longmans, Green and Co. 7th ed. 1909) (1848).
242. JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM 82 (1861) (“[A] favourite contrivance has been the
fiction of a contract, whereby at some unknown period all the members of society engaged to obey
the laws, and consented to be punished for any disobedience to them . . . .”). Mill also rejected
social-contract theory in his essay On Liberty. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 140–76 (1869).
243. See e.g., H.C. CAREY, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1837); H.C. CAREY, PRINCIPLES
OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (1858); see also THOMAS COOPER, LECTURES ON THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY (1826); FRANCIS WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1837). Wayland’s
Elements of Moral Science contains a brief discussion, apparently referring to positive law. FRANCIS
WAYLAND, THE ELEMENTS OF MORAL SCIENCE 401–09 (1835). Other 19th-century American
economists also ignored the social-contract or contractarian theories of government. See,
e.g., SAMUEL P. NEWMAN, ELEMENTS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1835); WILLARD PHILLIPS, A
MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE INSTITUTIONS,
RESOURCES, AND CONDITION OF THE UNITED STATES (1828); AMASA WALKER, THE SCIENCE OF
WEALTH: A MANUAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY: EMBRACING THE LAWS OF TRADE, CURRENCY, AND
FINANCE (1866).
244. See generally HENRY VETHAKE, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1838).
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While political leaders and courts at the time of the Constitution’s
creation sometimes spoke of a “social compact” or “social contract” as
fundamental law, they used these terms in reference to the text of either the
U.S. or a state constitution, or occasionally to a treaty or inter-state agreement.
John Adams spoke of his 1780 draft of the Massachusetts Constitution as “a
social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen and
each citizen with the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws
for the common good.”245 A 1781 Pennsylvania Supreme Court decision
spoke in similar terms, referring to the text of the Articles of Confederation.246
In 1782, Virginia’s highest court declared about its state constitution, “since
we have a written record of that which the citizens of this state have adopted
as their social compact[,] and beyond which we need not extend our
researches.”247 The social compact was the text, and one need not look
further. Some delegates, including James Wilson of Pennsylvania as well as
Madison, used a social-contract analogy at the constitutional convention,
arguing that the states were the equivalent to individuals in a state of nature,
and that the constitutional text would be their social contract.248 Alexander
Hamilton complained in Federalist No. 21 of the lack of sanctions in the “social
compact,” referring to the Articles of Confederation then in force.249 In
Federalist No. 44, by contrast, James Madison did speak of excessive state power
to declare legal tender or issue paper currency or make ex post facto laws to
be “contrary to the first principles of the social compact and to every principle
of sound legislation.”250 For that reason the proposed Constitution took these
powers away from the states. By contrast, “Brutus,” widely believed to be New
York Judge and constitutional opponent Robert Yates, wrote in the
Antifederalist that the proposed Constitution was deficient because “[t]he

245. 8 PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 237 (Gregg L. Lint et al. eds., 1989).
246. Respublica v. Chapman, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 53, 54–55 (Pa. 1781). The decision was
reported in U.S. Reports because Alexander Dallas, the first Supreme Court reporter, grouped
Pennsylvania and U.S. decisions together in the first volume.
247. Commonwealth v. Caton, 4 Call 5, 7 (Va. 1782) (Pendleton, C.J.); see also VanHorne’s
Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 304 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795) (“The preservation of property then
is a primary object of the social compact, and, by the late Constitution of Pennsylvania, was made
a fundamental law.”); Ex parte Martin, 13 Ark. 198, 207 (1853) (speaking of the Arkansas
Constitution as a “social compact”); Kamper v. Hawkins, 3 Va. (1 Va. Cas.) 20, 57 (Va. 1793)
(Tyler, J.) (speaking of the period immediately after the Declaration of Independence as prior
to the existence of any “social compact,” which awaited the formation of either the Articles of
Confederation or the Constitution).
248. JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 90, 97–98
(Adrienne Koch ed., 1966); see also 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 315
(Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Madison, likening social contract to the Constitution’s agreement
among the states). This position provoked a famous speech from Daniel Webster in 1833. DANIEL
WEBSTER, THE CONSTITUTION NOT A COMPACT BETWEEN SOVEREIGN STATES (1833).
249. THE FEDERALIST NO. 21, at 101 (Alexander Hamilton, Dec. 12, 1787) (Oxford Univ.
Press 2008).
250. THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 223 (James Madison, Jan. 25, 1788) (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
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principles . . . upon which the social compact is founded, ought to have been
clearly and precisely stated, . . . [b]ut on this subject there is almost an entire
silence.”251
As John Jay, first Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court, put it
in Chisholm v. Georgia:
Every State Constitution is a compact made by and between the
citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner; and the
Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the
people of the United States to govern themselves as to general
objects, in a certain manner. By this great compact however, many
prerogatives were transferred to the national Government, such as
those of making war and peace, contracting alliances, coining
money, etc. etc.252
The Court later concluded that treaties are also “compacts.”253 In sum,
although these judges and other writers spoke of a social contract or compact,
it was nearly always in relation to the text of the federal Constitution, state
constitutions, or some other authoritative document. There was little support
for the view that once the Constitution was ratified a social contract consisting
of principles not articulated in any text should remain in force.
The closest the early United States Supreme Court ever came to
recognizing a social contract apart from the text was Justice Samuel Chase’s
brief discussion in Calder v. Bull. Chase suggested that a state legislature lacked
the authority to alter fundamental rights even though “its authority should
not be expressly restrained by the Constitution, or fundamental law, of the
State.”254 Rather, “[t]he purposes for which men enter into society will
determine the nature and terms of the social compact . . . .”255 This prompted
a debate with Justice James Iredell who, while concurring in the judgment,
rejected Chase’s broad fundamental-rights perspective, concluding that
natural-law principles apart from the constitutional text would apply “no fixed
standard” because “the ablest and the purest men have differed upon the
subject.”256
In Corfield v. Coryell, Justice Bushrod Washington, then riding as a circuit
judge, concluded that the highly general language of the Article IV Privileges
and Immunities Clause, which had been borrowed from the Articles of

251. “BRUTUS,” THE ANTIFEDERALIST NO. 2 (Nov. 1, 1787). Yates had also been a delegate to
the Constitutional Convention from New York.
252. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 471 (1793).
253. Id. at 475; see also Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1 (1823) (repeatedly using the
term “compact” to describe the agreement by which Kentucky was severed from Virginia).
254. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
255. Id.
256. Id. at 399. For thoughtful discussion, see DENNIS J. GOLDFORD, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION AND THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINALISM 101–03 (2005).
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Confederation,257 implied a set of specific rights.258 Justice Washington never
referred to a social contract or compact, however. Rather, the idea was that
the text of the Constitution recognized these rights, although the term
“privileges and immunities” had to be interpreted.
The idea that the highly general language of either the Article IV or,
later, the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause, actually
embodied a list of unarticulated social-contract principles obtained a small
amount of traction in the mid-19th century. It never claimed a majority
position in even a single Supreme Court decision, however. A half century
after Corfield, Justice Noah Haynes Swayne invoked the social contract in his
dissent in the Slaughter-House Cases.259 The majority had refused to apply the
recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause260
to invalidate a New Orleans monopoly given to a slaughterhouse. Swayne’s
argument was that the general term “privileges and immunities” included a
list of unenumerated rights contained in a social contract, and among these
was the right to pursue a lawful occupation free of monopoly. According to
Justice Swayne these rights accorded with “the plainest considerations of

257. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1 (“The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.”); cf. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art.
IV, para. 1 (“[T]he free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the
several States.”).
258. Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states?
We feel no hesitation in confining these expressions to those privileges and
immunities which are, in their nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by the
citizens of the several states which compose this Union, from the time of their
becoming free, independent, and sovereign. What these fundamental principles are,
it would perhaps be more tedious than difficult to enumerate. They may, however,
be all comprehended under the following general heads: Protection by the
government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right to acquire and possess
property of every kind, and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety; subject
nevertheless to such restraints as the government may justly prescribe for the general
good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one state to pass through, or to reside in
any other state, for purposes of trade, agriculture, professional pursuits, or
otherwise; to claim the benefit of the writ of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain
actions of any kind in the courts of the state; to take, hold and dispose of property,
either real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or impositions than are
paid by the other citizens of the state; may be mentioned as some of the particular
privileges and immunities of citizens, which are clearly embraced by the general
description of privileges deemed to be fundamental: to which may be added, the
elective franchise, as regulated and established by the laws or constitution of the
state in which it is to be exercised.
Id.
259. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1872).
260. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States.”).
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reason and justice” and “the fundamental principles of the social compact.”261
While Swayne’s dissent was largely ignored, the two dissenting opinions by
Justices Field and Bradley were widely cited as rallying cries for the limitation
of state power to interfere in the freedom to pursue a lawful occupation.
Neither invoked the social contract.262 More recent scholarship has reached
the same conclusion.263
In his Commentaries on the Constitution, conservative anti-Jacksonian
Joseph Story had acknowledged the theory of a social compact. However, “the
doctrine itself requires many limitations and qualifications, when applied to
the actual conditions of nations . . . .”264 For Story the only meaningful
definition of a social contract was the federal and various state constitutions
ratified in the wake of the American revolution. His position was contained in
a chapter entitled “Nature of the Constitution—Whether a Compact.” He
concluded that there may have been a social compact that antedated the
United States Constitution, but it “existed in a visible form between the
citizens of each state in their several constitutions.” As a result, all forms of
this compact were “written.”265 Usage from the middle of the 19th century to
the Gilded Age, while economic substantive due process was percolating in
the state courts, was similar. For example, in Dred Scott, Chief Justice Taney
complained that the slave-holding states would never have agreed to the
Constitution if they believed it would treat slaves as “citizens.”266 Of course, he
was speaking of the constitutional text. Neither Taney’s opinion for the Court
or any of the six concurring opinions or two dissents ever referred to a social
contract or compact.
Social-contract language did appear more frequently during the heyday
of substantive due process, but always in dicta. Further, the way the concept
was used only suggested how indeterminate and unhelpful it was as a rationale
for constitutional decision-making. A good illustration is People v. Budd, where
a divided New York Court of Appeals upheld a statute regulating the prices
charged by grain elevators.267 Justice Andrews spoke for the majority
concluding that “the very nature of the social compact” is to recognize

261.
262.
263.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 129 (Swayne, J., dissenting).
Id. at 83 (Field, J., dissenting); id. at 111 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., KURT T. LASH, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND
IMMUNITES OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP (2014) (ignoring the social contract in the common
understanding of privileges and immunities both prior to and after the Fourteenth Amendment);
accord Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments:
Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785 (1982).
264. 1 STORY, supra note 56, § 327.
265. Id. §§ 306–18.
266. Scott v. Sandford (Dred Scott), 60 U.S. 393, 404–05 (1856); see DON E. FEHRENBACHER,
THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS 355 (1978); cf. Prigg v.
Commonwealth, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 660 (1842) (agreeing that some southern state would
have thought slavery to be a part of the social compact).
267. People v. Budd, 117 N.Y. 1 (1889).
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governmental power “to prescribe regulations demanded by the general
welfare for the common protection of all.”268 By contrast, Justice Gray’s dissent
concluded that the regulatory statute “violates the social compact under
which we live.”269
A year earlier, the United States Supreme Court had upheld a similar law.
At one point in his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Waite used the term
“social compact” to describe Acts of Parliament and state constitutions. At
another point he quoted the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution as a social
compact by which citizens contracted with one another for the “common
good.”270 Justice Harlan quoted the same language in Jacobson, 30 years later,
when the Court upheld a Massachusetts statute mandating vaccination.271 In
all of these decisions the term “social compact” referred to an enacted text.
In Bertholf v. O’Reilly the New York Court of Appeals upheld a statute that made
a landlord liable for permitting an unlicensed tenant to sell liquor on the
property to a man who became intoxicated and then ran over and killed the
plaintiff’s horse.272 Justice Andrews wrote for the unanimous court that
[t]he question whether a statute is a valid exercise of legislative
power is to be determined solely by reference to constitutional
restraints and prohibitions. The legislative power has no other
limitation. . . . The theory that laws may be declared void because
deemed to be opposed to natural justice and equity, although they
do not violate any constitutional provision, has some support in the
dicta of learned judges, but has not been approved, so far as we
know, by any authoritative adjudication, and is repudiated by
numerous authorities.273
In sharp contrast, Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, discussed previously, held that a
tax raised to finance a railroad bridge violated a fundamental right in the
“social compact” because the monies were not used for a public purpose.274
Here, the term was used as a justification for reaching beyond the

268.

Id. at 7; see also Losee v. Buchanan, 51 N.Y. 476, 484 (1873).
By becoming a member of civilized society, I am compelled to give up many of my
natural rights, but I receive more than a compensation from the surrender by every
other man of the same rights, and the security, advantage and protection which the
laws give me. So, too, the general rules that I may have the exclusive and undisturbed
use and possession of my real estate, and that I must so use my real estate as not to
injure my neighbor, are much modified by the exigencies of the social state.

Id.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
147–49.

Budd, 117 N.Y. at 34 (Gray, J., dissenting).
Munn v. People, 94 U.S. 113, 124 (1876).
Jacobson v. Commonwealth, 197 U.S. 11, 27 (1905).
Bertholf v. O’Reilly, 74 N.Y. 509 (1878).
Id. at 514 (emphasis omitted).
Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655, 663 (1874); see also supra text accompanying notes
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constitutional text, which never limited the state taxing power to public
purposes. While the “public purpose” doctrine might be viewed as recognition
of a right created by the “social compact” aside from the text, the doctrine was
short lived.275
Notwithstanding their support for the Topeka holding, the constitutional
law writers that we today regard as parents of economic substantive due
process paid scant attention to the social contract as a basis for their beliefs.
Thomas M. Cooley, the principle author of the public purpose doctrine, had
almost nothing to say on the subject in Constitutional Limitations, other than to
observe that courts used it mainly to express a conclusion that they had
already drawn from an explicit statement in a state or Federal Constitution.276
In his Treatise on Taxation, he did make a single mention of the “social
compact” as a source for the public purpose doctrine.277 John Dillon never
mentioned it at all.278 Francis Wharton’s Commentaries on Law (1884)
contained an extensive discussion but ultimately concluded that law was
customary, evolving over several centuries, rather than the product of a single
social agreement.279 Wharton’s view reflected the historicist thought of the
day, developed particularly in Sir Henry Maine’s Ancient Law. Maine rejected
the social contract as a basis for society, arguing instead that legal rights and
norms had evolved over a long period of social trial and error.280
One might expect that Christopher Tiedeman, the most libertarian of
the substantive due process writers, would be a strong promoter of the social
contract. But he described social-contract theory as “the extreme limits of
absurdity.”281 He drew this conclusion not in his prominent treatise on
constitutional regulatory power,282 but rather in an interesting 1890
monograph entitled The Unwritten Constitution, which was an argument against
“strict constructionists” who believed that the Constitution could have no
meaning other than what was explicitly granted by the text.283 In his Police
Power treatise, Tiedeman concluded:

275. See supra text accompanying notes 150–59.
276. COOLEY, supra note 124, at 198 n.1; see also id. at 47 (using the term to refer to a written
declaration of rights).
277. THOMAS M. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TAXATION, INCLUDING THE LAW OF
LOCAL ASSESSMENTS 68 (1881).
278. DILLON, supra note 124.
279. WHARTON, supra note 124, §§ 42–52, 63–64, at 78–86, 101–05 (1884).
280. HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE EARLY HISTORY OF
SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS (1861); see also HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 3–5.
On Wharton’s historicism, see DAVID M. RABBAN, LAW’S HISTORY: AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT
AND THE TRANSATLANTIC TURN TO HISTORY 15–23, 325–60 (2013).
281. CHRISTOPHER G. TIEDEMAN, THE UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY INTO THE FUNDAMENTALS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 70 (1890).
282. See generally TIEDEMAN, POLICE POWER, supra note 124.
283. TIEDEMAN, supra note 281, at 130.
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It may now be considered as an established principle of American
law that the courts, in the performance of their duty to confine the
legislative department within the constitutional limits of its power,
cannot nullify and avoid a law, simply because it conflicts with the
judicial notions of natural right or morality, or abstract justice.284
Tiedeman went on to acknowledge, however, that in cases of
constitutional ambiguity due deference should be made to questions of
natural liberty. For example, one might be deprived of liberty without actually
being confined, or of property without actually being subjected to forcible
expropriation.285 These ideas were “glittering generalities” that permitted the
judge to reach a little beyond the constitutional text. Then he added this:
If, for example, a law should be enacted, which prohibited the
prosecution of some employment which did not involve the
infliction of injury upon others, or which restricts the liberty of the
citizen unnecessarily, and in such a manner that it did not violate
any specific provision of the constitution, it may be held invalid,
because in the one case it interfered with the inalienable right of
property, and in the other case it infringed upon the natural right
to life and liberty.286
While refusing to embrace the rhetoric of social contract, the Gilded Age
writers read the words “property” and “liberty” in the Fourteenth Amendment
due process clause in expansive ways, reaching prospective legislation of
general application. Thus, Lochner and similar cases in both state and federal
courts could strike down employee-hours regulation or upset occupational
licensing statutes without ever mentioning the social contract. These statutes
deprived affected persons of both “liberty” and “property” without due
process.287 Even so, Justice Holmes complained in both Lochner and Adkins,
nearly 20 years apart, that the Court’s decisions striking down hours and
wages regulation could not be shown to depend on any “specific provisions”
in the Constitution itself, but rather relied only the “vague contours” of the
Fifth Amendment.288
The union of social-contract theory and liberal constitutional statecraft
or economic policy is not a part of either the original Constitution or the
classical Constitution that emerged several decades later and prevailed

284. TIEDEMAN, POLICE POWER, supra note 124, at 7.
285. Id. at 10.
286. Id. at 11.
287. E.g., People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143, 146 (1910).
288. Adkins v. Children’s Hosp., 261 U.S. 525, 568 (1923) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Lochner
v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). Holmes referenced the Fifth
Amendment because the statute in question was passed by Congress to regulate wages in
Washington, D.C. As such it was not controlled by the Fourteenth Amendment, which limited
state action.
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through the era of economic substantive due process. The ideology of social
contract is largely a 20th-century phenomenon, originating in post-New Deal
attacks on legislation and rational basis constitutional tests,289 but later picked
up by welfare liberals as well.290 Its principal 20th-century manifestations are
public-choice theory on the right and Rawlsian social justice on the left.291 The
real source of classical liberal doctrine as reflected in the courts, particularly
after the Jackson era, was migration of classical economic theory into legal
thought. In that, the social contract never played a significant role.
V. CONCLUSION
Classical constitutionalism was not the doctrine of the founders. It was an
extraordinarily important movement, however, that occupied the middle
portion of American constitutional history. The nearly half century period
from the Constitution’s making until the establishment of classical theory
under the Taney Court came first. The classical Constitution emerged from
the Jacksonian coalition’s reaction to state involvement in economic
development that critics believed was not justified for viable projects, that
harmed the property rights of others, and that so often represented legislative
capture for the benefit of the few.
Even this Jacksonian Constitution was not “classical” in the libertarian
sense. Accompanying the rise of constitutional laissez faire were the great
Jacksonian “reform” movements. Strong regulation of morals under
essentially Christian principles was transferred away from churches that had
been weakened by decades of division to government authority.292 The
misconceived notion that our constitutional thought has ever been
dominated by moral libertarians is an equally important fallacy, whose
treatment is reserved for another day.
Economic classicisim as a dominant constitutional ideology came to a
sudden end in the late 1930s, and today the “post-classical” constitutional era
is approaching 80 years old. The dominant view today is that the
constitutional revolution that upended the classical Constitution was
“progressive.” When capitalized, that term refers to an important but relatively

289. E.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 1. For the state of thinking as of the mid-20th
century, just before the rise of modern public choice theory, see generally J.W. GOUGH, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT (2d ed. 1957).
290. E.g., RAWLS, supra note 227.
291. For a good history and discussion of the principal works, including the application of
social-contract theory to constitutional law, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 597–642 (3d
ed. 2003).
292. See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 243–62. On the Jackson Era as an age of increased
public regulation of morals, see ROBERT H. ABZUG, COSMOS CRUMBLING: AMERICAN REFORM AND
THE RELIGIOUS IMAGINATION (1994); GEORGE M. THOMAS, REVIVALISM AND CULTURAL CHANGE:
CHRISTIANITY, NATION BUILDING, AND THE MARKET IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY UNITED STATES
(1989); IAN R. TYRRELL, SOBERING UP: FROM TEMPERANCE TO PROHIBITION IN ANTEBELLUM
AMERICA, 1800–1860 (1979).
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short-lived political movement that lasted from around 1900 to around 1920
and actually ended while constitutional classicism was still very much alive.
When used with a small “p,” as is more common in legal and constitutional
history, it refers to a much broader movement that encompasses
Progressivism, the New Deal, the Warren Court, the Great Society, and even
the agenda of the Democratic Party and some independents and Republicans
today.
For both its defenders and its critics, describing this movement as
“progressive” enables them to go back and discover some lost element of
constitutional law. In fact, however, most of the changes in economic policy
and the constitutional doctrine that displaced constitutional classicism are not
“progressive” at all. They are better described as “neoclassical” or
“marginalist,” reflecting centrist changes in theories of economics and value
embraced by a wide population, including many who would never describe
themselves as progressive.293 That is why we can never go back.

293.

See HOVENKAMP, supra note 6, at 1–12.

